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Article 4

ACCOMMODATING CAPITAL AND POLICING LABOR:
ANTITRUST IN THE TWO GILDED AGES
SANDEEP VAHEESAN *
ABSTRACT
In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress sought to prevent big
businesses from maintaining and augmenting their power through
collusion, mergers, and exclusionary and predatory practices and
also aimed to preserve the ability of workers to act in concert. At
times, the antitrust laws have benefited ordinary Americans. Antitrust achievements include the restructuring of the oil industry in
1911, the creation of competitive market structures in the midtwentieth century, and the termination of AT&T’s telecommunications monopoly in 1984.
Yet, the history of antitrust in the United States is not one of uninterrupted successes. Over two forty-year periods, the executive
branch and federal courts, in enforcing and interpreting the antitrust laws, have failed to advance Congress’s vision and indeed
inverted congressional intent. During the original and current
Gilded Ages, the antitrust laws were and are used to protect the
power of large-scale business and also to limit the autonomy of
workers to organize and demand higher wages and better working
conditions. Through this anti-labor application, the federal government has employed antitrust to aid big business, rather than
restrain its power.
Despite this history of accommodating capital and policing labor, the antitrust laws can still be reinterpreted and redeemed.
Congressional, executive, and judicial action can remake these
laws to control the power of large corporations and also protect
the freedom of all workers to organize for higher wages and better
working conditions. A renewal of antitrust, in accordance with the
expressed purposes of Congress, would help remedy the inequities
of the New Gilded Age and create a more just society.
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INTRODUCTION
[A]s legislators we may constitutionally, properly, and wisely allow laborers to make associations, combinations, contracts, [and]
agreements for the sake of maintaining and advancing their wages,
in regard to which, as a rule, their contracts are to be made with
large corporations who are themselves but an association or combination or aggregation of capital on the other side.—Senator
George Hoar 1
[H]istory shows that the victories won under [the Sherman Act]
have been the suits against labor organizations, while great trusts
and monopolies have grown and flourished.—Representative M.
Clyde Kelly 2
The federal antitrust laws—the Sherman, 3 Clayton, 4 and Federal Trade
Commission Acts 5—have a complicated history. The enforcement of these
laws has produced some landmark successes and delivered important benefits
to the public. Federal antitrust enforcement restructured the oil refining industry in 1911, 6 helped create decentralized market structures in the midtwentieth century, 7 and ended AT&T’s stranglehold over the telecommunications industry in 1984. 8 Yet, at other times, the federal antitrust agencies
and courts, in enforcing and interpreting the antitrust laws, failed to advance
Congress’s vision and indeed inverted its intent. During the first forty years
following the Sherman Act’s passage, and again over the past four decades,
these laws were and have been generally applied and interpreted to structure
markets to privilege monopolistic and oligopolistic businesses and to curtail
the liberty of workers. 9
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

21 CONG. REC. 2728 (1890).
51 CONG. REC. 9087 (1914).
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012).
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
William G. Shepherd, Causes of Increased Competition in the U.S. Economy, 1939–1980,
64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 613, 626 (1982).
8. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226–34 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
9. Contrary to libertarian and neoclassical accounts of a “free market” economy, state action
is a precondition for markets and determines who has power and wealth in a society, most fundamentally, through the enforcement of property rights and contracts. Those with a large holding of
property, or, say, a monopoly on an essential form of property, wield a great deal of coercive power
over others. Those with little or no property have little or no coercive power. The question is not
whether the state acts or does not act, but to whose benefit it acts. Warren J. Samuels, The Economy
as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 261, 305–07 (1973). The Supreme Court has in the past recognized the fact that state action
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In enacting the principal antitrust laws, Congress aimed to check the
power of large-scale capital and protect concerted labor action from federal
interference. The framers of the antitrust laws understood corporate power
broadly. Congress passed the antitrust laws to protect consumers and producers from powerful corporate sellers and buyers, maintain markets open to
all comers, and defend the American political system against corporate capture. 10 At the same time, they did not want these new laws to be employed
against collectives of workers. The legislative histories of both the Sherman
and the Clayton Acts indicate that Congress intended these statutes to control
the power of capital, not labor. 11 Indeed, a common view in Congress was
that the antitrust laws and labor unions would serve complementary functions
and together limit the power of monopolies and trusts. 12
During the decades following the passage of the Sherman Act, overlapping with the original Gilded Age, 13 the government failed to control the
controls the scope of property rights and enables contract law. In a 1971 decision holding that
welfare recipients were entitled to due process before loss of benefits, the Court noted that welfare
benefits could be considered a form of property and that “[m]uch of the existing wealth in this
country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). Earlier, in finding the enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants in housing to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
wrote,
These are cases in which the States have made available to such individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the
enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially
able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
10. John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original Intent” and the
Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 304–05 (1988); Rudolph J.
Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 314–15 (1991).
11. Louis B. Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1287
n.14 (1939).
12. For instance, one member of Congress called for “counter combinations among the people”
to challenge the power of large corporations. 21 CONG. REC. 2565 (1890) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
13. The Gilded Age is conventionally thought to have ended around the turn of the twentieth
century with the rise of the Populist and Progressive movements. The historical evidence suggests,
however, that the New Deal era lasting from the 1930s through the 1970s was a “long exception”
or an “interregnum between Gilded Ages.” Jefferson Cowie & Nick Salvatore, The Long Exception:
Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American History, 74 INT’L LABOR & WORKING-CLASS
HIST. 3, 5 (2008); Paul Krugman, Introducing This Blog, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A
LIBERAL (Sept. 18, 2007, 11:45 PM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/09/18/introducingthis-blog/; see also Sarah Jones, Lessons from the Gilded Age, NEW REPUBLIC (June 13, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/149005/lessons-gilded-age (“America is in a new Gilded Age, or so
the headlines say. ‘It’s Beginning to Look a Lot Like the Gilded Age,’ Bloomberg warned in February, noting that the late nineteenth century ‘was a time of exploding economic inequality, stagnant
living standards, growing concern about monopolies, devastating financial crises . . . brazen political corruption, frequent pronouncements that the American republic was doomed, and seemingly
unending turmoil over race and national identity.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Justin Fox, It’s
Beginning to Look a Lot Like the Gilded Age, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-07/it-s-beginning-to-look-a-lot-like-the-gilded-age)).
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growth of monopolies and oligopolies and instead used the antitrust laws to
limit the activities of labor unions. Although the United States Supreme
Court established strict rules against price fixing, 14 it limited the ability of the
government to challenge corporate mergers.15 This combination of a prohibition on price fixing and a tolerance of consolidation contributed to the first
wave of mergers in American history. 16 Instead of helping move the United
States toward a less concentrated industrial structure, the antitrust laws accelerated the rise of monopolies and oligopolies. Although the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson
launched a vigorous anti-monopoly campaign, these efforts, at most, undid
only a part of the consolidation that resulted from the merger mania between
1897 and 1904. During this same time, even as the Supreme Court permitted
economy-wide consolidation, it applied the antitrust laws to restrict the activities of labor unions. 17 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the federal
courts used the antitrust laws to discipline workers and to limit the ability of
unions to apply pressure against hostile employers through secondary boycotts and strikes. 18 In the words of economic historian Richard White, the
Sherman Act was “aimed at capital but hit labor.” 19
Breaking with the mid-twentieth century approach to antitrust, the federal courts and antitrust enforcers, since the late 1970s, have once again interpreted—indeed reinterpreted—antitrust law to expand the autonomy of big
capital and restrict the freedom of workers. The executive branch and judiciary have minimized concerns about the power of corporations. They have
replaced congressional (and once-judicially validated) economic and political objectives with an “efficiency” or “consumer welfare” 20 goal. In the area
of mergers, the Court has taken a generally hands-off approach, meaning that
14. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
15. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
16. “The years following the Knight decision [one of the first significant cases tried under the
Sherman Act] witnessed the greatest consolidation movement in the nation’s history, and most states
proved economically impotent against the new, giant corporations operating in national and even
world markets.” NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS, 1895–1904, at 166 (1985).
17. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
18. See infra Section II.B.
19. RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 384 (2011).
20. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 66 (1978))); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 1 (2010) (“Regardless of how enhanced market power likely would be manifested,
the Agencies normally evaluate mergers based on their impact on customers.”). Although the distinction between consumer welfare and economic efficiency is not important to the thesis of this
Article, a review of the case law shows that consumer welfare is the goal of contemporary law. John
B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not
Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 192 (2008).
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the federal antitrust agencies have become the principal policymakers and
used their power to handicap their own ability to stop mergers. 21 Except for
horizontal mergers in highly concentrated markets that threaten to leave a
market with four or fewer players, the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) today generally do not stop or even remedy most horizontal
mergers. 22 This lax approach to mergers has yielded multiple waves of consolidation across the economy and contributed to a highly concentrated industrial structure. Along with the agencies’ permissive approach to mergers,
the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of anti-monopoly law and restricted the ability of plaintiffs to challenge predatory pricing23 and refusals
to deal. 24 The federal antitrust agencies have done little to resist this doctrinal
retrenchment and have not brought a significant anti-monopoly case arguably
since the lawsuit against Microsoft in 1998. 25
This general deference toward large businesses has been paired with
vigilance toward collective action by labor. The federal antitrust agencies,
especially the FTC, repeatedly challenged union-like organization by workers and professionals. The FTC also consistently called on states to scale
back occupational licensing rules that can help consumers and workers. With
this pro-capital, anti-labor orientation, the antitrust laws in the new Gilded
Age resemble antitrust in the original Gilded Age. 26 Laws intended to challenge the privileges of monopoly and preserve space for workers to organize
are once again being used to preserve the existing power structure and undermine attempts by labor to strike a more equitable bargain with capital. 27
Through congressional, executive, and judicial action, the antitrust laws
can be reinterpreted to honor their original legislative intent and to create a
more just and equitable society. This reinterpretation and revival of antitrust
law would neither be easy nor be immediate. It would require new legislation
and a radical change in personnel both at the federal antitrust agencies and
on the federal bench and the erasure of decades of accumulated pro-monop-

21. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, § 4 (“The measurement
of market shares and market concentration is not an end in itself, but is useful to the extent it illuminates the merger’s likely competitive effects.”).
22. John Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and the Safe Harbor in Merger Review: False
Positives or Unwarranted Concerns?, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 837, 855 (2017).
23. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224 (1993).
24. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
25. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Suit against Microsoft
for Unlawfully Monopolizing Computer Software Markets (May 18, 1998), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1764.htm.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. Frank Pasquale, When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital Deformation of U.S. Competition Policy, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2017, at 4–5.
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oly and pro-oligopoly precedent. Yet, the conservative coup against the historical understanding of the antitrust laws beginning in the 1970s 28 reveals
the malleability of these statutes. At a minimum, the antitrust agencies and
courts should reorient the antitrust laws to advance the congressional intent
expressed in the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. The Congresses that
passed these statutes sought to limit the power of large-scale capital over
consumers and producers, competitors, and citizens and, at the same time,
were near-unanimous in stating that these laws should not interfere with the
joint action of workers. The federal antitrust agencies and the courts should
rediscover these legislative histories. In this current era of deep economic
and political inequality, the policy objectives expressed by Congress in 1890
and 1914 remain as important as ever to ordinary Americans. Persisting with
the current antitrust paradigm would only uphold an unjust and increasingly
unpopular status quo.
Part I will lay out the legislative vision for the antitrust laws, showing
that the framers of these statutes sought to control the power of large businesses 29 and to protect the freedom of workers and their right of collective
action. 30 Part II will turn to administration and interpretation of the antitrust
law from 1890 to the 1930s and examine how the executive branch and courts
defanged the new laws against big business and weaponized it against workers during this period. 31 Part III will review antitrust over the past four decades—the Second Gilded Age—and describe the troubling pro-business, 32
anti-worker application and interpretation of the antitrust statutes over this
period. 33 Part IV will explain how antitrust law can still be remade in accordance with the original congressional vision and become a powerful instrument to create a more equitable society. 34
I. THE ANTI-MONOPOLY, PRO-WORKER VISION UNDERLYING U.S.
ANTITRUST LAW
The Congresses that enacted the antitrust laws had an expansive vision
to curtail the power of concentrated capital in American society. These laws
were passed against the backdrop of growing public fears about large corporations, which emerged in the new national market in the decades after the

28. The decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), was key
in this transformation and retrenchment of antitrust law. Id.; see also Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1152 (1981).
29. See infra Section I.A.
30. See infra Section I.B.
31. See infra Sections II.A–B.
32. See infra Section III.A.
33. See infra Section III.B.
34. See infra Sections IV.A–B.
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Civil War. 35 Americans recognized the totalizing power of these corporate
titans. They believed these new giants threatened ordinary Americans’ interests in their capacity as consumers, workers, farmers, entrepreneurs, and citizens. 36
The legislative histories of the antitrust laws can and should inform their
interpretation. Despite the late Justice Scalia’s strident advocacy against the
use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, courts, including the Supreme Court, continue to consult legislative history when interpreting ambiguously phrased statutes. 37 Even under Justice Scalia’s philosophy of selectively looking to the historical record for guidance, 38 open-ended statutes
such as the Sherman Act—more akin to broad constitutional provisions than
to a detailed and precisely drafted federal statute 39—arguably should be interpreted in light of congressional purposes.
A review of the legislative histories of the three principal antitrust statutes reveals a broad understanding of corporate power. Congress in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries recognized that this power manifested itself in several ways. The members of Congress who drafted the antitrust laws had a rich understanding of the power of monopoly and oligopoly
and believed that such businesses exercised authority akin to private governments. 40 Ohio Senator John Sherman described the trusts and monopolies as

35. James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 283–84 (1989).
36. See also WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST
246–47, 334 (1991); HANS B. THORELLI, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 138–49 (1955); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1226–28 (1987). See generally LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST
MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA (1978).
37. David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1739–40 (2010).
38. Justice Scalia’s use of the debating and drafting record was not consistent. He consulted
and championed the use of these records in constitutional interpretation but denounced their use in
statutory interpretation. William N. Eskridge Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist
but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1306–07 (1998).
39. The key substantive provisions of the three main antitrust statutes are phrased in sweeping
terms. The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” and “monopoliz[ation] or attempt[s] to monopolize.” 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–2 (2012). The FTC Act outlaws “[u]nfair methods of competition.” Id. § 45. The Clayton
Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions whose effects “may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.” Id. § 18. The Supreme Court once described the antitrust laws as
“the Magna Carta of free enterprise.” United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972); see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933) (“As a
charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to
be desirable in constitutional provisions.”).
40. K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 72 (2016).
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exercising a “kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government.” 41 More than fixating on a particular material effect of big business, 42
many leading members of Congress spoke out against these new corporate
behemoths because they could, and did, exercise unaccountable power over
Americans. 43 Although prices were generally falling in the United States in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, members of Congress denounced the power of corporations to raise prices above competitive levels
and capture wealth from the consuming public. 44 And for these Congresses,
higher consumer prices were an important—but not the only—manifestation
of monopoly and oligopoly power in the American political economy. The
drafters of the antitrust laws held that dominant and other powerful corporations threatened the freedom and viability of competitors and the preservation
of democratic institutions.
As Congress sought to curtail the power of large businesses, it aimed to
preserve freedom of action for workers and their representative organizations. Workers, unions, and their congressional supporters were concerned
that the antitrust laws would be used against collective action by labor. The
legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests a congressional desire to exempt labor from the new law’s ambit. After a series of court decisions hostile
to workers, Congress enacted an express exemption for labor in the Clayton
Act. This exemption states that “labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce.” 45 The legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates that many members of Congress viewed labor organizing not as a target
of antitrust enforcement but as a complement to antitrust enforcement—both
essential to controlling the power of big businesses.
A. Curtail the Power of Concentrated Capital
In passing the three principal antitrust statutes, the respective Congresses expressed deep concerns about the power of concentrated capital.
The legislative histories of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts reveal an
expansive understanding of corporate power. The members of the Con-

41. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
42. Notably, the economics profession was either indifferent toward or opposed to the passage
of an antitrust law. THORELLI, supra note 36, at 120–21.
43. Senator Edmunds stated that, notwithstanding the possible material benefits of some trusts,
these concentrations of power would “come to be tyrannies, grinding tyrannies, that have sometimes
in other countries produced riots, just riots in the moral sense.” 21 CONG. REC. 2726 (1890). One
member of Congress in the debates preceding the enactment of the Clayton Act captured this power
succinctly. While he conceded that the trusts could be operated for the public benefit, he characterized this view as naïve because unchecked private power “affords too great a temptation to frail
humanity.” 51 CONG. REC. 9186 (1914) (statement of Rep. Helvering).
44. Robert H Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 101 (1982).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012).
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gresses that debated, drafted, and passed the antitrust statutes were not concerned with just one aspect of corporate power. Representatives and senators
warned of the power of corporations to control American society in myriad
ways. The congressmen feared private autocracy threatened the interests of
Americans as consumers, farmers, workers, business proprietors, and citizens. 46 The antitrust statutes were Congress’s efforts to protect ordinary
Americans from the power of the new corporate giants that defined the political economy of the United States.
1. Protect Consumers, Producers, and Consumers from the Power
of Large Corporations
As Robert Lande shows in painstaking detail, the members of Congress
that drafted the three primary antitrust statutes condemned monopolies and
trusts for capturing wealth from American consumers, farmers, and other producers. 47 The corporate giants of the day used their power to raise prices to
consumers and depress prices paid to farmers and workers, impoverishing
ordinary Americans. In the debate leading up to the passage of the Sherman
Act, Senator James George denounced the higher prices from monopoly as
“extortion which makes the people poor.” 48 The private taxes collected by
monopolies and cartels were a moral outrage akin to robbery, 49 not an academic concern about “deadweight loss[es]” for economists to contemplate in
seclusion. 50
Large corporations’ power to depress prices to producers, especially
farmers, was another recurring theme. Representative Heard, for instance,
stated that the corporate titans of the day have “stolen untold millions from
the people.” 51 Congressman Taylor recognized that the trusts exercised great
power as both sellers and buyers and condemned the beef trust for “rob[bing]
the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other.” 52 For Congressman Bland, the beef trust was a principal enemy of the farmer. He asserted
that “there is no trust in this country that today is robbing the farmers of the
great West and Northwest of more millions of their hard-earned money than
this so-called Big Four beef trust of Chicago.” 53 This congressional interest
in the impact of trusts on farmers is not surprising. Farmers, acting collectively through organizations such as the Farmers’ Alliance, were among the

46. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 10, at 304–05; Peritz, supra note 10, at, 314–15.
47. Lande, supra note 44, at 82–142.
48. 21 CONG. REC. 1768 (1890).
49. Id. at 2614 (statement of Rep. Coke).
50. Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-Examination of
the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359, 373 (1993).
51. 21 CONG. REC. 4101 (1890).
52. Id. at 4098.
53. Id. at 4099.
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leading supporters of anti-monopoly legislation in the late nineteenth century. 54
In the debates in 1914 in the run-up to the passage of the FTC and Clayton Acts, the theme of corporate theft from consumers and producers was
once again at the forefront. The principal Senate sponsor of the FTC Act
expressed concern about “unreasonable and extortionate prices.” 55 Another
Senator stated that monopolies and trusts “mulct the people out of hundreds
of millions of dollars each year” 56 and characterized monopoly and oligopoly
pricing as robbery. 57 One Congressman sought to “secure the people from
unjust tribute levied by monopolistic corporations.” 58 In the debates preceding the enactment of the Clayton Act, Senators Cummins and Thompson
spoke of “protecting the people against the rapacity and the avarice of monopoly” 59 and the “extortion practiced by the trust,” 60 respectively. Representative Morgan endorsed the creation of the FTC because it would limit
corporate “power to arbitrarily control prices and thus exact unjust profits
from the people.” 61
Just as they were concerned with protecting consumers and producers
from the power of the trusts, the Congresses that enacted the antitrust statutes
were committed to protecting small businesses and other competitors from
the power of large-scale capital. Senator Sherman declared, “It is the right
of every man to work, labor, and produce in any lawful vocation and to
transport his production on equal terms and conditions and under like circumstances.” 62 He deemed this right to be “industrial liberty” and the foundation of equality in American society. 63 Senator George held that, without
congressional action, capitalist power would “at some not very distant
day . . . crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all small enterprises.” 64
He rhetorically asked: “Is production, is trade, to be taken away from the
great mass of the people and concentrated in the hands of a few men . . . ?” 65
Representative Mason went further than most of his colleagues and argued
that preserving opportunities for small businesses should receive precedence

54. CRONON, supra note 36, at 343; Gary D. Libecap, The Rise of the Chicago Packers and
the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 242, 256 (1992).
55. Federal Trade Commission: Hearing on S.B. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong. 25 (1914) (statement of Sen. Newan, S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce).
56. 51 CONG. REC. 13223 (1914).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 8854.
59. Id. at 14256.
60. Id. at 14223.
61. Id. at 9265.
62. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2598.
65. Id.
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over consumer interests. 66 He believed the theoretical efficiencies of largescale enterprise could come at too high a price:
Some say that the trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced prices; but if the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to 1
cent a barrel it would not right the wrong done to the people of this
country by the “trusts” which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven honest men from legitimate business enterprises. 67
When they debated the FTC and Clayton Act nearly a quarter-century
later, members of Congress once again took an interest in the protection of
competitive opportunities for small enterprises. For Senator Reed, an objective of the FTC Act was to “keep the highways of opportunity unobstructed . . . so that all may have a fair chance to gain a livelihood and to
embark in business.” 68 A Senate colleague aimed to preserve open and equal
market opportunities for all participants. 69 Senator Lane described the existential threat of large enterprises to small businesses, stating that without
comprehensive federal legislation “every small and honorable dealer may be
put to intentional and infinite annoyance or driven out of business by his
larger or more crafty rival.” 70 Senator Cummins, albeit expressing somewhat
contradictory sentiments, wanted to preserve the domain of “individual initiative” against “the power of the corporation.” 71 Policing unfair practices in
the marketplace was another important theme. Congressman Stevens spoke
for the need to protect “healthful competition” 72 from threatening business
practices. Sounding a similar note, Senator Newlands condemned market
practices “against public morals” that inflicted harm on competitors.73 Another Senator held that “oppression or advantage obtained by deception or
questionable means is the distinguishing characteristic of ‘unfair competition.’” 74
The debates culminating in the passage of the Clayton Act also featured
the preservation of opportunities for all comers. The protection of small business from overweening private power was an expressed goal. Representative
Nelson lamented the disappearance of small business in a wave of consolidation. 75 A House colleague condemned large enterprises’ quest for “industrial
domination.” 76 In endorsing the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act (also
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Lande, supra note 44, at 102.
21 CONG. REC. 4100 (1890).
51 CONG. REC. 13231 (1914).
Id. at 14791–92 (statement of Sen. Burton).
Id. at 13223.
Id. at 12742.
Id. at 14937.
Id. at 11112.
Lande, supra note 44, at 110 n.171 (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 12248 (1914)).
51 CONG. REC. 9167 (1914).
Id. at 9086.
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known as the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act), 77 Congressman Bennett
stated that it would “preserve the chances of the average man to make a place
for himself in business.” 78
2. Preventing Capitalist Takeover of Political Institutions
While coercion in the marketplace was an animating theme in the legislative debates, the Congresses that passed the antitrust laws viewed concentrated corporate power as a threat to the American political system itself. Private capture and even displacement of government is an important theme in
the legislative debates leading up to the passage of the landmark antitrust
statutes. The representatives and senators debating and drafting the bills signaled the threat of private dictatorship. They spoke of the threat to democratic institutions in American society and even warned of corporate autocracy.
Corporate control of political decisions was an important theme in the
debate over the Sherman Act. The specter of corporate capture of the state
loomed large. Senator Hoar deemed the monopolies of the late nineteenth
century to be “a menace to republican institutions themselves.” 79 In light of
the power of these new corporate behemoths to control state governments, a
Senate colleague called for a strong federal check on this private power. 80
Senator Sherman went even further and described the possibility of monopolies and trusts assuming control of key public decisions and displacing government. He did not mince words on the connection between private power
and dictatorship. He explicitly stated, “If we would not submit to an emperor[,] we should not submit to an autocrat of trade.” 81 Identifying the capital of private autocracy, he asked his Senate colleagues to “consider . . .
whether, on the whole, it is safe in this country to leave the production of
property, the transportation of our whole country, to depend upon the will of
a few men sitting at their council board in the city of New York.” 82 A colleague echoed the profound threat to the public of a few individuals making
decisions that affected the entire nation. 83

77. Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2012)).
78. 95 CONG. REC. 11506 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
79. 21 CONG. REC. 3146 (1890).
80. See id. at 2460 (“These combinations already defy or control powerful transportation corporations and reach State authorities. They reach out their Briarean arms to every part of our country. They are imported from abroad. Congress alone can deal with them, and if we are unwilling
or unable there will soon be a trust for every production and a master to fix the price for every
necessity of life.”).
81. Id. at 2457.
82. Id. at 2570.
83. Id. at 2598 (statement of Sen. George).
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As with the debates over the Sherman Act, the theme of private assumption of governmental powers was central in the debates over the FTC and
Clayton Acts. Echoing Senator Sherman’s comments from a quarter-century
earlier, Senator Cummins warned that material benefits of large-scale enterprise would come at too great a price “if it involves the surrender of the individual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single master mind.” 84
In endorsing the FTC Act, Congressman Stevens stated that the growth of
trusts and monopolies had created among Americans “a very just apprehension that this wealth, and power growing out of it, may be not only used to
the detriment but also may be a potential source of injury and oppression.” 85
Deeming the Sherman Act to be a failure, Senator Newlands contended that
corporate giants were so embedded in the American political economy that
few dared to challenge their prerogatives.86 Senator Kenyon posed the choice
before his colleagues starkly as between government taming private monopoly or private monopoly taking over the government. 87
The congressional discussion over the Clayton Act also revealed grave
worries about private usurpation of government authority and featured especially evocative and rich rhetoric. Representative Kelly spoke of monopoly
as “the invisible government which has controlled the visible Government in
this Nation for many years.” 88 The Congressman additionally denounced the
monopolies’ capture of government and their conversion of democratic institutions into servants of big capital:
Great combinations of capital for many years have flaunted their
power in the face of the citizenship, they have forced their corrupt
way into politics and government, they have dictated the making
of laws or scorned the laws they did not like, they have prevented
the free and just administration of law. In doing this they have
become a menace to free institutions, and must be dealt with in
patriotic spirit, without fear or favor. 89
Representative Nelson even offered a conservative case for the Clayton
Act’s anti-merger provision, presenting the choice as one between decentralized markets or eventual public ownership of corporations. If the trend toward monopoly continued, Nelson stated the people would select “public
ownership of trusts for the benefit of all” over “the private ownership of the
trusts for the privilege of the few.” 90 For Nelson, this would be “the final
84. 51 CONG. REC. 12742 (1914).
85. Id. at 8850.
86. S. REP. NO. 62-1326, at 19 (1914) (“[W]e find that the trusts are more powerful to-day than
when the antitrust act was passed, and that evils have grown up so interwoven with the general
business of the country as to make men tremble at the consequence of their disruption.”).
87. 51 CONG. REC. 13158 (1914).
88. Id. at 9087.
89. Id. at 9086.
90. Id. at 9167.
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triumph of socialism in this country.” 91 For Senator Borah, capitalist control
of the state would trigger a powerful reaction and culminate in political and
social chaos. Without a new antitrust law to fill major gaps in the Sherman
Act and to impose real checks on the power of monopolies and trusts, he
painted a Hobbesian future in which unlimited business power would “divide
our people into classes, breed discontent and hatred, and in the end riot,
bloodshed, and French revolutions.” 92
When the Clayton Act was amended in 1950, 93 representatives and senators stressed the connection between concentrated industrial structures and
the rise of totalitarianism. 94 They believed that decentralization was critical
to protecting democracy in the United States and toward that end strengthened the Clayton Act’s anti-merger provision. 95 Several members of Congress argued that economic autocracy and political autocracy were intimately
intertwined. 96 Congressman Celler drew a causal chain from the rise of the
trusts in Germany to Hitler’s ascension to power and ultimately to World War
II. 97
B. Protect Workers’ Ability to Undertake Collective Action
The Congresses that debated the Sherman and Clayton Acts sought to
preserve freedom for workers and farmers to engage in collective action. In
enacting the antitrust laws, the legislative focus was on limiting the power of
big business, not interfering with the freedom of workers to organize to raise
wages and improve their working conditions. The members of Congress who
drafted the Sherman and Clayton Acts took pains to ensure these new laws
would police capital and accommodate labor. For many members of Congress, the new federal antitrust laws and labor organizing were two methods

91. Id.
92. Id. at 15955.
93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
94. Lande, supra note 44, at 137–38.
95. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 16452 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver) (“I am not an alarmist,
but the history of what has taken place in other nations where mergers and concentrations have
placed economic control in the hands of a very few people is too clear to pass over easily. A point
is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching that point in this country, where the public steps
in to take over when concentration and monopoly gain too much power. The taking over by the
public through its government always follows one or two methods and has one or two political
results. It either results in a Fascist state or the nationalization of industries and thereafter a Socialist
or Communist state.”).
96. Id. at 16446 (remarks of Sen. O’Mahoney); id. at 16503–04 (remarks of Sen. Aiken).
97. 95 CONG. REC. 11486 (1949).
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by which to protect millions of ordinary Americans against the power of concentrated capital. 98 In the words of one Senator, “counter combinations
among the people” were necessary to control the trusts. 99
In the lead-up to the passage of the Sherman Act, several members of
Congress feared that the new law would be applied against organizations that
represented workers and farmers. The first draft of the bill that would become the Sherman Act prohibited “all arrangements, trusts, or combinations
between such citizens or corporations, made with a view or which tend to
advance the cost to the consumer of any such articles.” 100 Labor unions (and
agricultural cooperatives) employed collective action to raise workers’ wages
and farmers’ incomes and thereby could sometimes raise prices for consumers. 101 Under Senator Sherman’s original bill, the federal government and
other plaintiffs could challenge collectives of workers. 102

98. For example, Senator Teller in the debate over the Sherman Act wanted to control trusts
and also preserve for “the laborers of the country the opportunity to combine either for the purpose
of putting up the price of their labor or securing to themselves a better position in the world.” 21
CONG. REC. 2561 (1890). Senator Hoar said,
[A]s legislators we may constitutionally, properly, and wisely allow laborers to make
associations, combinations, contracts, agreements for the sake of maintaining and advancing their wages, in regard to which, as a rule, their contracts are to be made with
large corporations who are themselves but an association or combination or aggregation
of capital on the other side.
Id. at 2728. He contrasted combinations of works with combinations of capital that “extort from
the community, monopolize, segregate, and apply to individual use, for the purposes of individual
greed.” Id. Senator Edmunds, who did not support an exemption for labor, nonetheless said,
[I]f capital and plants and manufacturing industries organize to regulate and so to repress
and diminish, if you please, below what it ought to be, the price of all the labor everywhere that is engaged in that kind of business, labor must organize to defend itself on the
other side.
Id. at 2727. For more context, see Louis B. Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I, 39
COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1287 n.14 (1939).
99. 21 CONG. REC. 2565 (statement of Sen. Stewart). This idea is what John Kenneth Galbraith
later described as “countervailing power” against existing concentrations of power in the economy.
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER 110–14 (1952).
100. 21 CONG. REC. at 2455.
101. During the debates preceding the passage of the Sherman Act,
Senator Edmunds expressed the view that if a law was to be passed condemning all agreements or combinations which tended to raise the price of commodities, neither labor nor
farmer organizations ought to be excluded, since the raising of wages and the raising of
prices of farm products by agreement or combination tended as much to raise the prices
of commodities as did similar agreements or combinations of any other class.
Boudin, supra note 98, at 1289.
102. William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887–1890, 23 U. CHI. L.
REV. 221, 250 (1956).
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Although Senator Sherman insisted that his bill would not affect the activities of labor unions, 103 many of his colleagues were not assuaged by his
assurances. They feared that absent an exemption the bill would apply to
labor organizations. The senators who spoke on this issue overwhelmingly
opposed applying the antitrust laws to labor collectives. 104 Senator Hoar distinguished between collectives of labor and collectives of capital (corporations, including trusts and monopolies). He deemed the former to be “lawful,
wise, and profitable, [and] absolutely essential to the existence of the commonwealth itself,” and the latter as instruments of “purposes of individual
greed.” 105 Senator Edmunds, the one member who opposed the exemption,
argued that the bill would deconcentrate markets and establish parity between
capital and labor. 106 In Senator Edmunds’ future world of equality between
labor and capital, unions would be unnecessary. 107 In light of the widely held
concern that labor would be targeted, Senator Sherman introduced an exemption for farm and labor organizations to address his colleagues’ concerns. 108
When reviewing the bill with the farm and labor exemption and other
amendments, the Senate Judiciary Committee adopted another bill entirely.
This new bill made no mention of higher consumer prices and instead prohibited restraints of trade. 109 It also did not include any express exemption
for labor unions and agricultural cooperatives. 110 Yet, the critics of Senator
Sherman’s earlier bill did not voice any concerns that this bill could be interpreted to restrict the collective actions of workers. 111 These champions of
labor, including Senator Hoar, supported the new bill and helped shepherd it
through the Senate and enact the Sherman Act. 112

103. Senator Sherman stated that “combinations of workingmen to promote their interest, promote their welfare, and increase their pay . . . are not affected in the slightest degree, nor can they
be included in the words or intent of the bill.” 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890).
104. Boudin, supra note 98, at 1287 n.14.
105. 21 CONG. REC. 2728 (1890).
106. Boudin, supra note 98, at 1287 n.14.
107. See id. (“In the course of the debate every senator who spoke on the subject, with the exception of Senator Edmunds, expressed himself as opposed to the application of the proposed law
to labor unions or farmers’ organizations, and expressed the belief that the entire Senate concurred
in that view. Senator Edmunds was the only one to dissent, apparently being of the belief that if the
proposed law would succeed in preventing the organization of trusts, labor organizations would
become unnecessary.”).
108. 21 CONG. REC. 2611–12 (1890); see also Joseph L. Greenslade, Labor Unions and the
Sherman Act: Rethinking Labor’s Nonstatutory Exemption, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 151, 155–56
(1988).
109. See Greenslade, supra note 108, at 160 (“[T]he Judiciary Committee’s bill focused on conduct that restrained trade.”).
110. Boudin, supra note 98, at 1287 n.14.
111. Id.
112. Greenslade, supra note 108, at 158–59.
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While evidently not the view of some scholars, 113 the most logical interpretation of the Sherman Act’s legislative history is that Congress did not
intend the law to reach the activities of labor unions and agricultural cooperatives. 114 Senator Sherman’s initial bill focused on joint activities between
“citizens or corporations” that raised prices to consumers.115 This language
provoked strong reactions from senators who wanted to protect labor and
farmer organizations from antitrust attack. 116 Once the bill’s language was
revised and made no reference to consumer prices, however, the pro-labor
senators no longer raised the threats to labor unions. 117 Barring some unanticipated and unrecorded change in their attitude toward unions, at least one
of these senators would have presumably demanded an exemption for labor
unions, as they had for the earlier bill, if they feared an antitrust threat to
unions. Instead, they supported the new bill without further amendment. 118
Many years later, Samuel Gompers, the President of the American Federation
of Labor and admittedly not a neutral source, stated, “We know the Sherman
law was intended by Congress to punish illegal trusts and not the labor unions, for we had various conferences with members of Congress while the
Sherman Act was pending, and remember clearly that such a determination
was stated again and again.” 119
In 1914, Congress unambiguously voiced its views on the application
of antitrust to labor unions by establishing an express exemption in the Clayton Act. Reacting to judicial application of the Sherman Act to the activities
of labor unions, 120 Congress sought to undo this court interpretation and restore workers’ full freedom to engage in collective action. Section 6 of the
Clayton Act is phrased in broad terms, declaring that “[t]he labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce.” 121 After a protracted
struggle to pressure Congress to overturn the judiciary’s anti-labor interpretation of the Sherman Act, 122 organized labor and its supporters in Congress
believed they had won a great victory, hailing the Clayton Act’s exemption
for labor as its Magna Carta. 123 The statute’s plain meaning does not legalize
113. Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880–1930, 66 TEX. L. REV.
919, 951 (1988).
114. Greenslade, supra note 108, at 160; THORELLI, supra note 36, at 231–32.
115. 21 CONG REC. 2455 (1890).
116. Boudin, supra note 98, at 1287 n.14.
117. Id.
118. Greenslade, supra note 108, at 158–59.
119. EDWARD BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 5 (1930) (quoting Samuel Gompers,
The Hatters’ Case. The Sherman Law—Amend It or End It., 17 AM. FEDERATIONIST 197, 202
(1910)).
120. Louis B. Boudin, Organized Labor and the Clayton Act: Part I, 29 VA. L. REV. 272, 273–
74 (1942); see infra Section II.B.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012).
122. See infra Part II.B.
123. Boudin, supra note 120, at 306–09.
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all union activity but does withdraw all union activity, including secondary
actions, from the purview of the antitrust laws. 124
The legislative history of the Clayton Act is full of denunciations of the
federal courts for applying the Sherman Act to the activities of labor unions.
This judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act was considered a perversion
of the statute. Representative Madden declared that the Senate that passed
the Sherman Act “clearly and unequivocally stated that its provisions would
not cover” labor unions. 125 Senator Ashurst held that the courts, by resorting
to “strained and harsh constructions,” overrode the intent of the framers of
the Sherman Act to protect labor unions. 126 Stressing that the Sherman Act
was intended to control the power of large corporate enterprise, Senator Williams declared:
A statute which was passed avowedly and without question to
check the operation of the tyranny of the combined money power
of the country as being a menace to free institutions was construed
by the Federal judiciary so as to operate against the freedom and
liberty of men engaged in hiring their labor. 127
Tracing the arc of American history in the nineteenth century, Congressman Buchanan condemned the Supreme Court for holding that labor is a
“commodity or an article of commerce” in this country and undoing not only
what Congress had intended but also what the Civil War had conclusively
resolved. 128
II. ANTITRUST DURING THE FIRST GILDED AGE: 1890–1930S
Despite Congress’s intent to police capital and accommodate labor
through the Sherman Act, the executive branch and the courts inverted this
legislative purpose. In the 1890s, the first decade of the Sherman Act, the
Supreme Court made two critical choices: The proscription of price fixing
and the acceptance of consolidation contributed to an unprecedented merger
wave. These two decisions transformed the structure of American industry
between 1896 and 1904. This tolerance of mergers was accompanied by executive and judicial hostility toward collective action by workers. Most of
the early Sherman Act prosecutions targeted labor rather than business. The
Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act to proscribe secondary boycotts
and strikes by workers and continued to follow this interpretation even after

124. Louis B. Boudin, Organized Labor and the Clayton Act: Part II, 29 VA. L. REV. 395, 410
(1943); see also Joseph Kovener, The Legislative History of Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 749 (1947).
125. 51 CONG. REC. 9087 (1914).
126. Id. at 13663.
127. Id. at 14588.
128. Id. at 16337.
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Congress established an antitrust exemption for labor unions. Multiple presidential administrations and federal courts warped a law intended to tame the
power of capital, converting it to tame the power of labor and create a more
pliant workforce to the benefit of capital.
A. A Failure to Check the Growth of Trusts
In a series of decisions, the early judicial interpretation of the antitrust
laws produced a major dichotomy. First, the Court held in the 1895 decision
United States v. E.C. Knight Co. 129 that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to restrict mergers in manufacturing and mining and so the
Sherman Act could not be used to challenge mergers in these sectors.130 In
establishing a distinction between interstate commerce (which Congress
could regulate) and production (which Congress could not regulate), 131 the
Court crippled the ability of the government to stop or undo anticompetitive
mergers using the Sherman Act. 132 Second, the Supreme Court, in a trio of
decisions between 1897 and 1899, adopted a strict ban on overt price fixing
between competitors. 133 The Court refused to entertain defenses to horizontal
price fixing or consider the “reasonableness” of the collusive prices. 134 It
established a per se ban on the practice that persists to this day. 135
These judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act encouraged businesses to grow and achieve monopoly and oligopoly through mergers. 136

129. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
130. Id. at 17. The Court stated that citizens should look to state governments for protection
from corporate consolidation. Id. at 16–17.
131. See id. at 13 (“The regulation of commerce applies to the subjects of commerce and not to
matters of internal police. Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among the
several States, the transportation and its instrumentalities, and articles bought, sold, or exchanged
for the purposes of such transit among the States, or put in the way of transit, may be regulated, but
this is because they form part of interstate trade or commerce. The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another State does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce, and the
intent of the manufacturer does not determine the time when the article or product passes from the
control of the State and belongs to commerce.”).
132. Samuel R. Reid, Antitrust and the “Merger-Wave” Phenomenon: A Failure of Public Policy, 3 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 25, 28–29 (1969).
133. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
134. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 331–32.
135. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. at 577. During the depths of the Great Depression, the Supreme Court softened the ban on horizontal price fixing for distressed industries. See Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). The Court restored the per se ban on horizontal
collusion in 1940. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
136. Naomi Lamoreaux explained:
The Court [in E.C. Knight] returned responsibility for oversight of large corporations to
the states, but events were not to permit matters to rest there. The years following the
Knight decision witnessed the greatest consolidation movement in the nation’s history,
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Corporations that previously sought to stabilize market prices through collusion abandoned this strategy. Under the judiciary’s reading of the Sherman
Act, competitors that organized pools (a common price-fixing arrangement
that did not involve the integration of business operations) would violate the
Sherman Act. 137 The E.C. Knight decision, however, granted businesses
broad freedom to merge with competitors. 138 Instead of price fixing, many
firms tried to achieve market stabilization through mergers with, and acquisitions of, rivals. 139 At least outside of sectors that directly involved interstate
commerce as the concept was then interpreted by the courts (such as railroads), businesses could merge with some confidence that these consolidations would be beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. 140 The Court blocked
one channel (price fixing) by which businesses could obtain market power
but opened the flood gates on another channel (mergers) by which businesses
could achieve a similar end. Indeed, mergers, by bringing different businesses under common control, are a more potent method of raising and stabilizing prices than collusive arrangements, which can be susceptible to
cheating by participants. 141
In a cruel irony to the congressional framers and public supporters of
the Sherman Act, the first fifteen years of this new law intended to curb the
power of trusts and monopolies witnessed the emergence of concentrated
markets across the economy. In the late 1890s and early 1900s, the United
States saw its first major merger wave, with hundreds of firms merging with
their rivals. 142 In 1899 alone, 1208 mergers occurred in the manufacturing

and most states proved economically impotent against the new, giant corporations operating in national and even world markets.
LAMOREAUX, supra note 16, at 166.
137. WHITE, supra note 19, at 175.
138. William Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act: Judicial Interpretation, 68 YALE
L.J. 900, 917 (1959); see also George Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger
Wave?, 28 J. L. & ECON. 77, 86–87 (1985) (“E.C. Knight made merger legal, at least in the minds
of many lawyers . . . .”).
139. Bittlingmayer, supra note 138, at 116–17; see, e.g., 2 SIMON N. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST
POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES 7 (1958) (“Three months after Judge
Taft’s decree enjoining the pool, the four Tennessee and Alabama companies consolidated to form
the American Pipe and Foundry Company. Nine months later, in March 1899, the merger was
extended, under the name United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Company, to take in the two
remaining defendants and five firms in the northeastern states, thus including 75 percent of the entire
industry.”(footnote omitted)).
140. Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust and the Foundations of
Modern American Business Regulation from Knight to Swift, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 99 (2005).
141. LAMOREAUX, supra note 16, at 87, 100; Rudolph J. Peritz, The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 321 n.182 (1989).
142. WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 144 (2d ed. 2004).
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and mining sectors. 143 Just two years earlier, in 1897, only sixty-nine mergers had occurred in these two fields.144 Writing in 1901, two prominent
economists, with a touch of hyperbole, described the nature of the change in
the political economic landscape of the country: “If the carboniferous age had
returned and the earth had repeopled itself with dinosaurs, the change made
in animal life would have scarcely seemed greater than that which has been
made in the business world by these monster-like corporations.” 145
Congress’s attempt to control mergers through the Clayton Act in 1914
proved unsuccessful. The new law had a major limitation. 146 It prohibited
acquisitions of corporate stock that could be anticompetitive but permitted
asset acquisitions with similar effects. 147 On top of this legislative “asset
loophole,” the Supreme Court added a judicial gloss that further handicapped
the government’s power to enforce anti-merger law. In FTC v. Western Meat
Co., 148 the Court held the government could not undo a stock acquisition after
the acquiring company had assumed ownership of the acquiree’s physical
assets. 149 This neutered anti-merger law predictably failed to control the corporate consolidation movement. In the 1920s, the number of mergers in manufacturing and mining annually never fell below 200 and hit a high of 1245,
exceeding the earlier annual high of 1208 in 1899. 150 And in many years
between 1914 and 1950, the federal antitrust agencies, including the newly
created FTC, did not bring suit to stop a single merger. 151

143. Reid, supra note 132, at 27.
144. Id.
145. JOHN BATES CLARK & JOHN MAURICE CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS 15 (1912). One
scholar has argued that different treatment of collusive arrangements in the United States and United
Kingdom—prohibition in the former, tolerance in the latter—explains the greater persistence of
smaller firms and decentralized industrial structures in the United Kingdom. See generally TONY
FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA, 1880–1990
(1992); Tony Freyer, The Sherman Antitrust Act, Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of
Reason: America and Great Britain, 1880–1920, 74 IOWA L. REV. 991 (1989).
146. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which governs mergers, originally read:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the
acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create
a monopoly of any line of commerce.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731–32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)). Congress amended the Clayton Act to cover asset acquisitions and all types of mergers. Act of December
29, 1950, ch. 1184, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1980).
147. See Milton Handler & Stanley D. Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the CellerKefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 652–53 (1961) (discussing the “assets loophole”
in the original Clayton Act).
148. 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
149. Id. at 563.
150. Reid, supra note 132, at 27.
151. Id.
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This early era, however, did see some major victories on the monopoly
front. Given the creation of monopolies in a number of key industries, the
public clamored for government action. 152 The administrations of Theodore
Roosevelt and especially of William Howard Taft and of Woodrow Wilson
initiated a number of major monopolization suits. 153 Targets of these cases
included American Tobacco, International Harvester, Standard Oil, Swift,
and U.S. Steel. 154 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States 155 and United States
v. American Tobacco, 156 the Supreme Court ordered the breakup of the monopolist in oil refining and the oligopolists in tobacco into smaller entities. 157
This anti-monopoly campaign continued through 1920 when legal and political changes brought it to an end. The Supreme Court held in United States
v. United States Steel Co., 158 that the steel giant’s growth through a series of
acquisitions did not violate the Sherman Act in the absence of particular acts
that excluded rivals. 159 And with the election of conservative Republican
President Warren Harding in 1920, the government showed little interest in
anti-monopoly and antitrust enforcement in general. 160
Notwithstanding the significant government monopolization victories
between 1904 and 1920, the merger wave had an enduring impact on the industrial structure of the United States. A number of today’s corporate giants
emerged during this period. General Electric was the product of eight firms
with a combined market share of ninety percent, Du Pont of sixty-four firms
with approximately seventy percent of the market, and U.S. Steel of 180
firms with sixty-five to eighty percent market share. 161 The economist Jesse
Markham, in a measured 1950 study, found that the effects of the turn of the
century merger wave were still clear decades later.162 He concluded that the
merger wave between 1896 and 1904 “left an imprint on the structure of the
152. See generally George Bittlingmayer, Antitrust and Business Activity: The First Quarter
Century, 70 BUS. HIST. REV. 363 (1996).
153. William S. Comanor & Frederic M. Scherer, Rewriting History: The Early Sherman Act
Monopolization Cases, 2 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 263, 264 (1995).
154. John J. Flynn, Monopolization Under the Sherman Act: The Third Wave and Beyond, 26
ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 4 (1981).
155. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
156. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
157. Peter C. Carstensen, Remedies for Monopolization from Standard Oil to Microsoft and Intel: The Changing Nature of Monopoly Law from Elimination of Market Power to Regulation of Its
Use, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 815, 824 (2011). For a critical take on the effectiveness of these structural
remedies, see Walter Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1951).
158. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
159. Id. at 451; Flynn, supra note 154, at 7–8.
160. William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the
Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1122 (1989).
161. ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 142, at 23.
162. Jesse W. Markham, Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers, in BUSINESS
CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 141, 180 (1955).
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American economy that fifty years have not yet erased.” 163 Ralph Nelson
went further and wrote that the merger wave at the turn of the twentieth century “laid the foundation for the industrial structure that has characterized
most of American industry in the twentieth century.” 164
B. Frustration of Collective Action by Workers
Despite the pro-labor statements in the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the DOJ and the courts interpreted the new antitrust law to reach
and limit collective action by workers. Almost as soon as the Sherman Act
became the law of the land, it was used against workers. Over the first four
decades of the new antitrust statute, the Supreme Court used the Sherman Act
to deprive workers of two powerful organizing tools: the secondary boycott
and strike. 165 Through these secondary actions, labor could apply pressure
on anti-union employers and organize an entire industry. 166 Unless an entire
industry was organized, union employers would face higher labor costs and
remain at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis non-union rivals. 167 Even after Congress enacted the statutory labor exemption in the Clayton Act, the
Court continued to apply the Sherman Act against secondary action.
The anti-labor potential of the Sherman Act became clear in its early
years. Between 1890 and 1897, a majority of successful prosecutions targeted labor rather than capital. 168 In the second case brought under the Sherman Act, the government targeted the workers who participated in the general
strike in New Orleans in 1892, which originated in a dispute between longshoremen and their employers. 169 The government characterized the strike
as a “gigantic and widespread combination of the members of a multitude of

163. Id.
164. RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 5 (1959).
165. If the workers at Manufacturer A go on strike due to discontent over wages, the strike is
deemed a primary strike. If the workers at Retailer B, a firm that purchases goods from Manufacturer A, go on strike to pressure Retailer B not to do business with Manufacturer A, the strike is a
secondary strike. If the consumers of Retailer B refuse to purchase goods from Retailer B to increase pressure on Retailer B not to carry the products of Manufacturer A, this action is a secondary
boycott. See Robert M. Schwartz, Secondary Targets Can Be Union’s Primary Focus, LABOR
NOTES (June 20, 2012), http://www.labornotes.org/2012/06/secondary-targets-can-be-unions-primary-focus?language=en.
166. DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO
CORPORATE LIBERALISM 71–72 (1995).
167. Id. at 196.
168. Hovenkamp, supra note 113, at 950. As Herbert Hovenkamp notes though, “These numbers may overstate the antilabor bias of early Sherman Act prosecutions because ten of the twelve
labor conspiracy cases arose from the great Pullman sleeping coach strike led by Eugene Debs,
which crippled the American railroad network in 1894.” Id. For a review of Sherman Act prosecutions in the 1890s, see generally William Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act: Early
Administration, 68 YALE L.J. 464 (1959).
169. United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 F. 994, 995
(C.C.E.D. La. 1893); Boudin, supra note 98, at 1293.
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separate organizations for the purpose of restraining the commerce among
the several states and with foreign countries.” 170 The District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana held that the Sherman Act applied to “combinations of labor, as well as of capital.” 171 Although the strike had ended by
the time the court heard the case, it granted the government’s request for injunctive relief and enjoined similar labor action in the future. 172
The most famous use of the Sherman Act against labor in the early years
was against the nationwide railroad strikes stemming from the labor dispute
between the Pullman Company, a monopoly in the manufacture of sleeping
cars, and its employees. 173 Workers at the Pullman company town in Illinois,
where the eponymous luxury sleeping cars were manufactured, went on
strike over a reduction in their wages. 174 Rail workers across the country
staged a secondary strike, with the aim of pressuring their employers to stop
hauling Pullman cars. 175 Even as many state and local officials across the
country adopted a laissez-faire posture and declined to interfere in the dispute
between workers and railroads unless violence occurred, the DOJ, headed by
a corporate attorney who had counseled railroads, intervened on the side of
capital. 176 The government brought an action against the workers, using the
Sherman and Interstate Commerce Acts, to end the Pullman strike. 177 The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government and against the striking
workers and union leaders, relying on the general commerce clause powers
of the federal government rather than the Sherman Act, to reach its holding. 178
The Supreme Court made its first major pronouncement on the Sherman
Act and labor in 1908. 179 In Loewe v. Lawlor, 180 the Court decided whether
the Sherman Act prohibited secondary boycotts undertaken as part of a campaign to organize workers at a hat manufacturer in Connecticut.181 The
Court, quoting a common law treatise on trade unions, stated that “every person has individually, and the public also has collectively, a right to require
that the course of trade should be kept free from unreasonable obstruction.” 182

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 F. at 995.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 1000.
THORELLI, supra note 36, at 394.
WHITE, supra note 19, at 418–19, 430.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 417–18, 441.
United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894); Letwin, supra note 168, at 481–85.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599–600 (1895).
Hovenkamp, supra note 113, at 951.
208 U.S. 274 (1908).
Id. at 283–85.
Id. at 295–96.
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After reviewing the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the Court concluded that attempts to exempt labor and farmer organizations from the bill
had failed, and thereby labor activities that affected interstate commerce were
subject to the Sherman Act. 183 Because the union-instigated secondary boycotts and strikes had “restrain[ed] and destroy[ed] interstate trade and commerce” 184 of the manufacturer, the Court held that the union and its members
could be held liable under the Sherman Act. 185 Affirming this ruling in Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 186 the Court wrote: “[T]he principle announced by the court [in Loewe] was general. It covered any illegal means
by which interstate commerce is restrained, whether by unlawful combinations of capital, or unlawful combinations of labor . . . .” 187
Even after Congress enacted an express exemption for labor in the Clayton Act, 188 the Supreme Court continued to apply the Sherman Act to restrain
the freedom of labor organizations. The Court in Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering 189 construed the Clayton Act’s labor exemption narrowly. According to the majority, the Clayton Act restricted the federal judiciary’s equity power only over the employees directly involved in a labor dispute, 190
not over secondary boycotts and strikes. The Court stated that Congress
sought to give legal protection to “particular industrial controversies, not a
general class war.” 191 For the Court, the secondary action entailed “a threat
to inflict damage upon the immediate employer, between whom and his employees no dispute exists, in order to bring him against his will into a concerted plan to inflict damage upon another employer who is in dispute with
his employees.” 192 Prosecutions of labor activities also continued apace and
actually increased after Congress enacted the exemption for labor. Nearly
eighty percent of the antitrust cases against labor between 1890 and 1929
were brought after the passage of the Clayton Act and its labor exemption in
1914. 193
Although strikes could impede interstate commerce, the Court held in
United Leather Workers International Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk

183. Id. at 301–02.
184. Id. at 308.
185. Id. at 308–09.
186. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
187. Id. at 438.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012).
189. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
190. Id. at 470.
191. Id. at 472.
192. Id. at 474. The Court affirmed this principle in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters’ Ass’n, 274 U.S. 37, 48 (1927).
193. Allen G. Siegel et al., The Antitrust Exemption for Labor—Magna Carta or Carte
Blanche?, 13 DUQ. L. REV. 411, 427 n.59 (1975).
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Co. 194 that this is “an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce.” 195
The Court concluded that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to reach
primary labor disputes that incidentally restrained interstate commerce. 196 A
few years earlier, the Court had indeed stated that unions were essential for
the welfare of workers in a capitalist society. 197
Nonetheless, some courts even outlawed primary strikes and picketing
under the Sherman Act. In the wake of Herkert & Meisel, the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America 198 prohibited primary strikes under the Sherman Act, drawing on common law precedent that prohibited third parties
from inducing workers to leave their jobs. 199 The judge found that the strikes
in nonunionized textile mills in Philadelphia were intended to help principally unionized mills in New York City, and that aiding workers in Philadelphia was “at best a secondary and remote” motive. 200 On this basis, the judge
concluded the strike was an improper restraint of commerce and illegal under
the Sherman Act. 201 Under the rationale of the decision, workers arguably
could not organize any new firm or region of the country: unionizing new
workplaces would reduce or eliminate wage disparities across firms and
thereby benefit already unionized workers and firms in an industry. At least
two courts held that the Clayton Act’s labor exemption provided no protection for labor unions and ruled that any collective labor activity that restrained
interstate commerce violated the Sherman Act.202
The courts’ anti-labor interpretation of the antitrust laws, contrary to the
wishes of Congress, reflected a broader trend in the Gilded Age in which the
judiciary overrode state and local decisions concerning the rights of workers. 203 The courts issued sweeping injunctions against labor activities and

194. 265 U.S. 457 (1924).
195. Id. at 471.
196. Id.
197. See Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921) (“Labor unions are recognized by the Clayton Act as legal when instituted for mutual help and lawfully
carrying out their legitimate objects. They have long been thus recognized by the courts. They
were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing
with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself
and family. If the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give
laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.”).
198. 35 F.2d 203 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
199. Id. at 206.
200. Id. at 205.
201. Id. at 208.
202. E.g., Quinlivan v. Dail-Overland Co., 274 F. 56, 65–66 (6th Cir. 1921); United States v.
Ry. Employes’ Dep’t, 286 F. 228, 233 (N.D. Ill. 1923).
203. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
75, 101 (1991). Many elites had no qualms about using state violence to discipline labor. William
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jailed union leaders and members for defying them, leading to the epithet
“government by injunction.” 204 The federal government did not adopt a laissez-faire approach to the contest between labor and capital but instead employed its coercive power to aid the interests of capital. 205 As Sven Beckert
writes of New York’s nineteenth century capitalist class:
Loudly proclaiming the need for “less government,” they simultaneously embraced greater state activism—ranging from the use of
the military and policing power of the state to quell domestic dissent to the restriction of such fundamental rights as the freedom of
movement, by successfully advocating the passage of antitramping
legislation in New York State.206
State action against workers in the United States was exceptionally violent
and succeeded in eroding the power of American labor. 207
III. ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE: THE LATE 1970S TO THE
PRESENT
In the latter part of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century,
the executive and judicial choices to embrace consumer welfare antitrust
have restored the antitrust law of the first Gilded Age to a troubling degree.
Over the forty-year period from the New Deal in the late 1930s until the
1970s, the Court interpreted the antitrust laws to serve as a check on the
power of capital. In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court acknowledged the congressionally expressed values of competitively priced goods, 208

Forbath quotes the views of then-Judge William Howard Taft. In a letter to his wife, Taft commented on the killing of striking Pullman workers, writing that “[Federal marshals and troops] have
killed only six of the mob as yet. This is hardly enough to make an impression.” Id. at 75; see also
Matthew Dessem, Happy Labor Day Weekend! In 1897: The New York Times Argued Police
Should Open Fire on Striking Workers!, SLATE (Sept. 2, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2017/09/02/read_the_new_york_times_lattimore_massacre_editorial_from_1897.html.
204. FORBATH, supra note 203, at 59, 101–09.
205. For a history of the business-backed anti-union litigation campaign in the early twentieth
century, see generally ERNST, supra note 166.
206. SVEN BECKERT, THE MONIED METROPOLIS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE CONSOLIDATION
OF THE AMERICAN BOURGEOISIE, 1850–1896, at 303–04 (2001).
207. See id. at 296–97 (“As America was ‘becoming a mighty armed camp, with enormous
armories,’ military force played a major role in challenging the collective action of workers. During
the 1890s, American strikers were killed at a rate of 2 per 100,000 and injured at a rate of 140 per
100,000, contrasting with France’s rate of no killings and only 3 injuries per 100,000. Arrest rates
diverged in a similarly dramatic fashion: It was ten times more likely that a striker would get arrested
in Illinois than in France. The cumulative results of such an embrace of violence were dramatic: As
Richard Oestreicher has pointed out, ‘[a]t the beginning of the era has of mass production, the
American labor movement was among the strongest in the world.’ By the 1920s, however, American unions had become considerably weaker than their counterparts abroad.” (footnotes omitted)).
208. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940).
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autonomy for small businesses, 209 and decentralization of economic
power. 210 Recognizing that powerful private entities exercise quasi-governmental power, the Supreme Court imposed antitrust duties and restrictions on
this corporate regulatory authority. 211 During this era, antitrust law placed
significant limits on the prerogatives of big business, especially in the areas
of mergers 212 and monopolistic conduct. 213 At the same time, antitrust law
carved out a large space for workers to act collectively, 214 though this freedom granted to labor did not extend to workers outside of conventional employment arrangements. 215
Since the late 1970s, the federal courts, the DOJ, and the FTC, informed
by former Solicitor General Robert Bork’s fallacious analysis of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, 216 have reoriented antitrust law away from
broad political economy and toward narrow microeconomics. 217 They have
renounced the congressional goals of the antitrust laws and held that the only
appropriate objective is the promotion of economic efficiency or consumer
welfare. 218 In implementing this model of antitrust, the federal antitrust agen-

209. E.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 20–21 (1964); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
210. E.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
211. E.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963); Fashion Originators’ Guild of
Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941).
212. E.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967); United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963).
213. E.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951); Am. Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
214. The Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives the federal court of equitable jurisdiction over nonviolent labor disputes. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2012); see, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
512 (1940) (“These cases show that activities of labor organizations not immunized by the Clayton
Act are not necessarily violations of the Sherman Act. Underlying and implicit in all of them is
recognition that the Sherman Act was not enacted to police interstate transportation, or to afford a
remedy for wrongs, which are actionable under state law, and result from combinations and conspiracies which fall short, both in their purpose and effect, of any form of market control of a commodity, such as to ‘monopolize the supply, control its price, or discriminate between its would-be
purchasers.’”).
215. See, e.g., Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145 (1942) (holding that
organized fishermen were not entitled to antitrust immunity because “a dispute among businessmen
over the terms of a contract for the sale of fish is something different from a ‘controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association . . . of persons . . . seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment’” (alterations in original)).
216. James Boyle, A Process of Denial: Bork and Post-Modern Conservatism, 3 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 263, 278–81 (1991).
217. The retrenchment of antitrust law is part of a larger big business-led project, spanning much
of the world, of overturning the social democratic capitalism of the post-World War II era. See
generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005).
218. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST
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cies and courts have adopted the desirability of corporate freedom as an article of faith, influenced by hypotheses developed and promoted by thinkers
associated with the University of Chicago. 219 Built on “an oversimplified
economics that often rests on unfounded or disproven assumptions,” 220 antitrust law today views most types of business conduct as positive or neutral.
Outside of express price fixing and market allocation with rivals, businesses
have expansive autonomy to control and dominate markets.
In contrast to the deference to accumulation and exercise of corporate
power, antitrust proscribes collective action by workers who are classified as
independent contractors, instead of employees, under federal law. In a period
of high inequality 221 and precarity for millions of Americans, 222 which has
been dubbed the “new Gilded Age,” 223 antitrust law increasingly resembles
antitrust law in the original Gilded Age and reinforces—rather than remedies—structural inequalities in American society. Federal enforcers and the
courts are once again using and interpreting antitrust law not to tame the
power of capital, but to tame the power of workers for the benefit of capital.
And as the fraction of workers not entitled to the antitrust exemption grows,
antitrust enforcers can target an ever-larger segment of American labor.

PARADOX 66 (1978))); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, § 1 (“Regardless of how enhanced market power likely would be manifested, the Agencies normally evaluate mergers based on their impact on customers.”). Although the distinction between consumer
welfare and economic efficiency is not important to the thesis of this article, a review of the case
law shows that consumer welfare is the goal of contemporary law. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note
20, at 192.
219. For two influential articles articulating “Chicago School” hypotheses on business behavior,
see Frank H. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984) and Richard A. Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
220. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Made (Too) Simple, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 917, 939 (2014).
221. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard University Press 2013).
222. See GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 35 (2011) (“In the
United States, the Bureau of Labour Statistics estimated in mid-2009 that over 30 million people
were in part-time jobs ‘of necessity’, more than twice as many as the number counted as unemployed, which made for an adjusted unemployment rate of 18.7 per cent. A vast proportion of those
jobs will remain part-time and low paid even if the economy picks up.”); see also BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S.
HOUSEHOLDS IN 2016, at 2 (2017) (“Forty-four percent of adults say they either could not cover an
emergency expense costing $400, or would cover it by selling something or borrowing money,
which has continued to improve from the 50 percent who were ill-prepared for this magnitude of
expense when first asked in 2013.”).
223. See Jefferson Cowie, America May Never Have Another New Deal, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar.
15, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/131401/america-may-never-another-new-deal (“The return of nineteenth-century-style plutocracy, crony capitalism, and shocking levels of inequality—
disparities that continued even after the excitement of Obama’s presidency—suggest a conscious,
confident, and powerful ruling class that has largely separated itself from the concerns of the nation’s working people.”).
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A. Acceptance of Monopoly and Oligopoly
The Supreme Court and the federal antitrust agencies have transformed
antitrust and, in large measure, neutralized the ability of these laws to control
corporate power. The Supreme Court has generally stood aside on the issue
of mergers. Here, the federal antitrust agencies have become the principal
policymakers and published merger guidelines that have become increasingly
tolerant of corporate consolidation. In the name of advancing the ahistorical
goal of consumer welfare, 224 the Supreme Court and lower courts have rewritten precedent on monopolization to favor large corporations. The agencies and courts still view horizontal price fixing and other forms of collusion
between rivals with hostility and stress the need to police this “supreme evil
of antitrust.” 225 Yet even here the results are underwhelming. An examination of the anti-collusion program reveals a campaign that inadequately deters
price fixing, often treats large corporate colluders with leniency, and devotes
resources to secondary or otherwise trivial matters.
1. Mostly Quiet on Mergers and Monopolies
In the area of mergers, the federal antitrust agencies have, in large measure, displaced the courts as the principal makers of policy. The Supreme
Court last heard and decided a merger challenge on the merits more than forty
years ago 226 and has not formally overruled strict merger precedents from the
1960s. 227 The DOJ and FTC have published a series of guidelines on how
they analyze horizontal mergers and when they are likely to challenge such
mergers. 228 Over time, the agencies have become increasingly tolerant of
corporate consolidation because of a belief that mergers can produce productive efficiencies that benefit consumers and society. 229 In the most recent
224. Among other deficiencies, the language of consumer welfare ignores how sellers were and
still are entitled to antitrust protection from powerful buyers. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am.
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235–36 (1948); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 320 (2007).
225. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
226. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
227. See, e.g., Polypore Int’l Inc. v. FTC, 686 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e see no
error resulting from the Commission’s application of the Philadelphia National presumption to find
that Polypore had illegally acquired Microporous, thus substantially lessening competition.”). In
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that a
horizontal merger that creates an entity with a market share of thirty percent is presumptively illegal.
Id. at 364. Some appellate courts, however, have held that the Philadelphia National Bank precedent no longer carries the weight it once did. E.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d
981, 990–91 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
228. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE &
FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MERGER GUIDELINES (1982).
229. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, § 10 (“[A] primary
benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus
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guidelines issued in 2010, the agencies moved further away from presumptions of illegality for mergers in concentrated markets. 230 They embrace an
analytical approach that calls for a showing of anticompetitive effects. 231 In
other words, the agencies have progressively restricted their own ability to
stop mergers. While not bound to adopt these guidelines, the courts have
often given great weight to the agencies’ analytical framework. 232
In practice, the antitrust agencies today challenge only horizontal mergers in highly concentrated markets. The FTC’s merger record is revealing.
Fifteen or twenty years ago, the FTC frequently challenged mergers that reduced the number of competitors in a market from eight to seven or seven to
six. 233 It, however, has rarely challenged these mergers in recent years, taking action only when a merger is poised to reduce the number of market participants to four or fewer. 234 And even when the FTC takes action against a
merger, it often does not seek to challenge and stop the merger in court. 235 In
an effort to remedy the predicted harms of horizontal mergers in concentrated
markets, both the FTC and the DOJ often permit these consolidations to proceed on the condition that the merging parties agree to divest assets in the
market in which they compete head-to-head or agree to behavioral duties and
restrictions. 236 Remarkably, the agencies fail to enforce their own merger

enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”). But see Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce,
Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 22750, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22750.pdf (“[W]e find
little evidence for plant- or firm-level productivity effects from [merger and acquisition] activity on
average, nor for other efficiency gains often cited as possible from [merger and acquisition] activity,
including reallocation of activity across plants or scale efficiencies in non-productive units of the
firm.”).
230. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, § 4 (“The measurement
of market shares and market concentration is not an end in itself, but is useful to the extent it illuminates the merger’s likely competitive effects.”).
231. Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 707–08, 721 (2010).
232. See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in a merger challenge). Hillary Greene has carefully documented and
analyzed the influence of the Merger Guidelines on judicial decision-making. Hillary Greene,
Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 771, 775 (2006).
233. Kwoka, supra note 22, at 855.
234. Id.
235. E.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Requires Fresenius Medical Care AG &
KGaA and NxStage Medical, Inc. to Divest Bloodline Tubing Assets to B. Braun Medical, Inc. as
a Condition of Merger (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftc-requires-fresenius-medical-care-ag-kgaa-nxstage-medical-inc.
236. See ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 142, at 196–99 (criticizing the agencies’ narrow analytical framework and “consultant” role in facilitating corporate consolidation).
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guidelines, especially the concentration thresholds that should trigger presumptions of illegality. 237
The agencies have taken a hands-off approach to vertical mergers since
the Clinton administration. 238 On the rare occasions they are concerned with
the competitive effects of a vertical consolidation, the DOJ and FTC generally do not seek to enjoin these deals in court. 239 In 2010 and 2011, the DOJ
permitted three large vertical mergers that had serious anticompetitive potential to proceed on the condition that the new vertically integrated companies
agree to behavioral duties and restrictions. 240 In one of these cases, the DOJ
found that the merger had no offsetting consumer benefits and yet chose not
to stop the consolidation in court. 241
Along with the agencies’ tolerance of corporate consolidation, the Supreme Court curtailed the reach of anti-monopoly law and granted expansive
freedom to monopolies and other dominant businesses. The Court has repeatedly cited concerns about deterring “pro-competitive” behavior (defined
as conduct that advances a particular conception of economic efficiency) in
limiting the ability of the government and other plaintiffs to challenge monopolies. 242 The Supreme Court has neutered anti-monopoly doctrine in two
areas in particular: predatory pricing and refusals to deal.
The Court practically eliminated predatory pricing as a cause of action
and granted large corporations the power to acquire and maintain market
dominance through temporary below-cost pricing. The Court initiated this

237. John Kwoka, Reviving Merger Control: A Comprehensive Plan for Reforming Policy and
Practice
19–28
(Oct.
9,
2018),
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Kwoka-Reviving-Merger-Control-October-2018.pdf.
238. Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Revising the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy
Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1, 4 (2015). The
Trump administration’s attempt to stop AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner was the first time the
government tried to block a vertical merger in court in nearly forty years. United States v. AT&T
Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 165 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Fruehauf Corp.
v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
239. See generally Salop & Culley, supra note 238, app.
240. United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149–50 (D.D.C. 2011); United States
v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00139, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88626 (D.D.C. July 30,
2010).
241. Competitive Impact Statement at 29–30, Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145 (No. 1:11cv-00106).
242. See, e.g., Pac Bell. Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commuc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009) (“To
avoid chilling aggressive price competition, we have carefully limited the circumstances under
which plaintiffs can state a Sherman Act claim by alleging that prices are too low.”).
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shift in a pair of decisions in the mid-1980s that cast doubt on whether predatory pricing occurs. 243 In one of these decisions, Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 244 the Court ignored the historical and empirical record on predation 245 and instead drew on simplistic theoretical
literature, stating “that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even
more rarely successful.” 246 In addition to asserting that predatory pricing is
not a real threat to competitive markets, the Court expressed a concern that
the threat of predatory pricing lawsuits alone could discourage price discounting. 247
Operating with these assumptions, the Court subsequently established a
legal standard very favorable to actual and would-be predators. To establish
predatory pricing, a plaintiff (government or private) must first show the defendant engaged in below-cost pricing and the defendant would likely recoup
the upfront losses through higher prices in the future. 248 The second prong,
recoupment, imposes especially high burdens on plaintiffs. 249 Under the recoupment requirement, plaintiffs have one of two options: either wait until
the defendant has eliminated its rivals and preserved or acquired monopoly
power or offer speculative stories on future recoupment to judges who have
been directed to examine predatory pricing allegations with great skepticism. 250 In 2007, the Supreme Court, in a rare instance of looking at upstream
effects, held that the restrictive two-part test announced in Brooke Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 251 should apply to claims alleging
predatory bidding practices in which monopsonies (single dominant buyers
in a market) inflate purchase prices to weaken or eliminate rival buyers.252

243. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
244. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
245. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of
Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655, 715 (1982).
246. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589.
247. Id. at 594.
248. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224 (1993).
249. Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695,
1720 (2013).
250. See id. at 1760 (“The recoupment requirement creates false negatives, in part, because
courts are not adept at predicting recoupment. Reliance on recoupment leads courts to incorrectly
conclude that predation has not taken place. In the hands of judges unversed in the mechanics of
competition and predation, recoupment presents an impossible-to-satisfy element in some courtrooms.”).
251. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
252. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 325–26
(2007).
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In addition to its general deficiencies, the Brooke Group test is especially illsuited for business with buyer-side power. 253
Much as they have freedom to engage in predatory pricing, dominant
firms have broad discretion to preserve their market power by refusing to
grant access to essential assets to rivals. 254 Over the past fifteen years, the
Court has curtailed refusal-to-deal claims against monopolists. In Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 255 the Court
held that the respondent’s refusal-to-deal claim had to be resolved through
the regulatory system, not antitrust litigation. 256 While arguably a narrow
holding confined to industries subject to public utility regulation, the Court’s
decision limited the reach of an earlier decision that had upheld refusal-todeal liability for a dominant firm. 257 The Court also adopted a Schumpeterian
perspective 258 in which monopoly—and the prospect of monopoly—is the
lifeblood of a capitalist system. It wrote that “[t]he opportunity to charge
monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place.” 259 This language flatly contradicts the legislative
history of the Sherman Act. Congress condemned monopoly for its economic
and political effects and, contrary to Justice Scalia’s dictum, did not view it
as the source of capitalism’s salvation. 260
Since Trinko, the Court appears to have only grown more hostile to refusal-to-deal allegations. In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 261 the Court applied the reasoning of Trinko to dismiss a price
squeeze claim against a regulated internet service provider. 262 If anything,
253. Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror, 62 EMORY L.J. 1509, 1533
(2013) (observing that buyers can wield tremendous power over sellers at market shares well below
the conventional monopoly share threshold).
254. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–11 (1985)
(“Although Ski Co.’s pattern of conduct may not have been as ‘bold, relentless, and predatory’ as
the publisher’s actions in Lorain Journal, the record in this case comfortably supports an inference
that the monopolist made a deliberate effort to discourage its customers from doing business with
its smaller rival. The sale of its 3-area, 6-day ticket, particularly when it was discounted below the
daily ticket price, deterred the ticket holders from skiing at Highlands. The refusal to accept the
Adventure Pack coupons in exchange for daily tickets was apparently motivated entirely by a decision to avoid providing any benefit to Highlands even though accepting the coupons would have
entailed no cost to Ski Co. itself, would have provided it with immediate benefits, and would have
satisfied its potential customers. Thus the evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not
motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer
goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149 (1951))).
255. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
256. Id. at 413–14.
257. See id. at 409 (“Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.”).
258. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 825 (1942).
259. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
260. See supra Section I.A.
261. 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
262. Id. at 457.
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the Court today may be even more hostile to refusal-to-deal claims than it
was in 2007. As a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, Justice Neil Gorsuch, one of President Trump’s two additions to the
Court, 263 extended the logic of Trinko and held that refusal-to-deal claims
would be recognized under only very exceptional circumstances. 264
Along with the Court’s retrenchment of monopoly law in two important
areas, the federal antitrust agencies, in particular the DOJ, have scaled back
their monopoly enforcement efforts. The DOJ has practically suspended
anti-monopoly enforcement over the past twenty years, filing just one pure
monopoly case since 2000 265 which settled. 266 The DOJ’s most notable antimonopoly action during the Obama years may have been non-action through
the closing of a lengthy investigation into Monsanto’s seed distribution practices 267 and the decision against bringing a monopolization claim against Amazon over its e-book pricing strategy. 268 As Chart 1 indicates, the DOJ’s neglect of monopoly matters is not new, dating back to the early 1980s and
being consistent across administrations except for a brief upsurge in investigations in the 1990s.

263. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neil Gorsuch Is Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
10,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supremecourt.html?_r=0.
264. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a plaintiff seeking to establish a refusal-to-deal claim must show that a monopolist “sacrifice[d] short-term
profits”).
265. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION: WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY 2008–2017,
at 5 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS] ; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION:
WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY 2000–2009, at 6 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/281484.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2000–2009 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD
STATISTICS].
266. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Texas
Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers (Feb. 25, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-texas-hospital-prohibitinganticompetitive-contracts.
267. Ian Berry & David Kesmodel, U.S. Closes Antitrust Investigation into Seed Industry, MonST.
J.
(Nov.
16,
2012),
https://www.wsj.com/artisanto,
WALL
cles/SB10001424127887324735104578123631878019070; Tom Philpott, DOJ Mysteriously Quits
Monsanto Antitrust Investigation, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/food/2012/12/dojs-monsantoseed-industry-investigation-ends-thud/.
268. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 756–62 (2017).
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CHART 1: DOJ MONOPOLY INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED BY YEAR 269
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Over the past decade, the FTC has filed cases against monopolists, with
a focus on parties that engaged in anticompetitive exclusive dealing 270 and
abusive patent enforcement. 271 Yet, many of these cases have involved monopolists of lesser consequence. 272 And like the DOJ, the FTC’s most newsworthy act on the monopolization front was arguably an act of omission. In
early 2013, the FTC rejected the recommendation of its legal staff and closed
its two-year investigation into Google’s search practices with highly unusual
“non-binding commitments” that did not include any enforceable conditions.273
Unfavorable precedent can explain only a part of the agencies’ lethargy
in the monopolization realm. Pro-defendant precedents such as Brooke
Group and Trinko loom large. Yet, these cases do not represent the entire
universe of anti-monopoly law. Monopoly precedent is not uniformly hostile
to enforcers, in particular for exclusive dealing and loyalty rebate claims.

269. Division Operations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations
(last visited Jan. 14, 2019).
270. E.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Intel Corp., No. 9341,
2010 F.T.C. LEXIS 82 (Oct. 29, 2010).
271. E.g., In re Motorola Mobility LLC, No. C-4410, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 96 (July 23, 2013);
In re Robert Bosch GmbH, No. C-4377, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 59 (Apr. 23, 2013).
272. See, e.g., In re IDEXX Laboratories, Inc., No. C-4383, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 11, at *6 (Feb.
11, 2013) (settling allegations that manufacturer of pet diagnostic products improperly required exclusivity from distributors); In re Pool Corp., No. C-4345, 2012 F.T.C. LEXIS 8, at *8–9 (Jan. 10,
2012) (settling allegations that distributor of pool products used exclusive dealing with manufacturers to foreclose other distributors).
273. In re Google Inc., No. 111-0163, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *22–24 (Jan. 3, 2013). A memo
drafted by the FTC’s Bureau of Competition recommended that the Commission sue Google for
anticompetitive practices including search bias and impeded advertisers from working with rival
search engines. See Brody Mullins et al., Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of Google, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 19, 2015), www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-google-1426793274.
Commissioner Rosch criticized his fellow commissioners for accepting a non-binding settlement.
Google, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *22–23. For a critical take on the FTC’s public explanation on
why it chose not to sue Google, see generally Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust: Why
the FTC Failed to Explain Its Inaction on Search Bias, Occasional Paper Series, HARV. J.L. &
TECH. (2013).
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Plaintiffs have achieved victories in court on monopolization claims, 274 including in a predatory pricing claim a decade after Brooke Group. 275
Instead of resisting the judicial retrenchment of anti-monopoly law, the
federal antitrust agencies have on occasion supported expanding the autonomy of monopolists and other dominant firms. During the George W. Bush
administration, the DOJ and FTC filed several amicus briefs that called on
the courts to weaken anti-monopoly precedent. 276 For a time, the DOJ even
served as Microsoft’s international advocate, criticizing anti-monopoly actions against the software company by the European Union 277 and the Korean
Fair Trade Commission. 278 In the final months of the second term of George
W. Bush’s presidency, the DOJ put out a report of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act that called for further retrenchment of anti-monopoly law. 279 This report
recommended relaxing existing Supreme Court anti-monopoly precedent, including in the areas of exclusive dealing 280 and predatory pricing 281 and
called for de facto legality for unilateral refusals-to-deal. 282 A three-commissioner majority at the FTC declined to join the report and issued a scathing
repudiation of it. 283 They described the report as “chiefly concerned with
firms that enjoy monopoly or near-monopoly power, and prescrib[ing] a legal
regime that places these firms’ interests ahead of the interests of consumers.” 284 To its credit, the Obama administration DOJ quickly withdrew this
pro-monopoly report in 2009. 285 Despite this ostensible philosophical shift,

274. E.g., McWane, 783 F.3d at 842; ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 303 (3d
Cir. 2012); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 315 (3d Cir. 2007).
275. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 953 (6th Cir. 2005).
276. E.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Pac. Bell Tel.
Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (No. 07-512); Brief for United States & FTC
Supporting Petitioner, Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004) (No. 02-682).
277. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Thomas O’
Barnett, Issues a Statement on European Microsoft Decision (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2007/226070.pdf.
278. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General J.
Bruce McDonald Regarding Korean Fair Trade Commission’s Decision in Its Microsoft Case (Dec.
7, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2005/213562.pdf.
279. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.
280. Id. at 140.
281. Id. at 73.
282. Id. at 129.
283. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and
Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice (Sept. 8, 2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-commissioners-react-department-justice-report-competition-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under/080908section2stmt.pdf.
284. Id. at 1.
285. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-reportantitrust-monopoly-law.
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the DOJ’s actual monopoly enforcement record represented continuity from
the Bush years. 286
2. The Underwhelming Campaign Against Corporate Collusion
The Supreme Court and the federal agencies continue to treat (overt)
collusion, which the Court has described as the “supreme evil of antitrust,” 287
as a serious antitrust offense. Price fixing and other forms of horizontal collusion remain per se illegal. 288 The antitrust agencies prioritize the prosecution of collusion. 289 The DOJ views the criminal prosecution of cartels and
cartel participants as the core of its antitrust mission. 290 For cartel activity,
the DOJ collected corporate fines of $985 million in 2015 and $450 million
in 2016. 291 In those two years, the DOJ had twelve and twenty-two individuals, respectively, sentenced to prison. 292 The DOJ has sent a number of
managers and executives to prison for their involvement in the auto parts 293

286. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265,
at 5.
287. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004). This is an empirically suspect assertion even from a consumer welfare perspective. Maurice
E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 505–09.
288. Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1998). Even for collusion-like conduct though, the courts do not consistently apply the per se rule or even a strong presumption of
illegality. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 156 (2013) (holding that an agreement
between branded and generic drug makers that resembles market allocation should be analyzed under the rule of reason); California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1139 (9th Cir.
2011) (concluding that a revenue sharing agreement between competing supermarkets should be
evaluated under the rule of reason).
289. Consider the DOJ’s workload numbers from 2016. The DOJ initiated twenty-three grand
jury investigations and filed fifty-one criminal cases. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008–2017
ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, at 4. Because only collusion is subject to
criminal enforcement today, all these cases presumably involved collusion. In contrast, the DOJ
filed fifteen merger challenges and zero monopoly complaints. Id. at 4–5. The numbers from 2007
during the George W. Bush administration reflect a similar breakdown, albeit with fewer merger
challenges. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2000–2009 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS,
supra note 265.
290. E.g., Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Prosecuting Antitrust
Crimes, Remarks as Prepared for the Georgetown University Law Center Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517741/download; Thomas O.
Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Perspectives on Cartel Enforcement
in the United States and Brazil, Address at the Universidade de São Paolo (Apr. 28, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/519601/download.
291. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265,
at 11.
292. Id. at 12.
293. Nick Bunkley, Japanese Auto Suppliers Are Fined, and Executives Agree to Prison, in a
Price-Fixing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/business/japanese-auto-suppliers-fined-in-us-price-fixing-case.html.
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and liquid crystal display 294 cartels and indicted the late Aubrey McClendon,
the CEO of Chesapeake Energy, over collusion in the acquisition of natural
gas leases. 295
Notwithstanding the rhetorical commitment and headline numbers, the
anti-collusion enforcement program is still far from satisfactory. 296 When
they target collusion, the agencies often impose inadequate penalties on offending corporations and individuals. The prison sentences are short compared to those for offenses inflicting much less harm on the public, 297 and the
fines are often a small fraction of the offenders’ annual revenues and profits. 298 John Connor and Robert Lande found that the overall cartel enforcement program, including both government prosecutions and private lawsuits,
fails to adequately deter collusion. 299 Their research shows that private damages and public penalties are “only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to
protect potential victims of cartelization optimally.” 300 From the perspective
of optimal deterrence, in the area of cartels, “[corporate] crime pays” 301 and

294. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Au Optronics Corporation Executive Sentenced for Role
in LCD Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/au-optronics-corporation-executive-sentenced-role-lcd-price-fixing-conspiracy.
295. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former CEO Indicted for Masterminding Conspiracy Not
to Compete for Oil and Natural Gas Leases (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/formerceo-indicted-masterminding-conspiracy-not-compete-oil-and-natural-gas-leases.
296. A basic contradiction lies at the heart of public antitrust enforcement in the United States.
The federal antitrust agencies have permitted markets to become much more concentrated. In highly
concentrated markets, oligopolistic firms recognize their mutual interdependence and often collude
tacitly to maximize collective profits over time. The antitrust laws cannot effectively police this
type of tacit collusion or coordination. The antitrust agencies, through their feeble merger enforcement policy, have allowed markets to become much more vulnerable to collusion. While allowing
the creation of market structures conducive to collusion, the agencies continue to emphasize prosecutions of explicit collusion between rivals. Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 161 (1993).
297. The average prison term for an individual antitrust violator sentenced in 2016 was under
one year and never higher than 923 days (less than three years) in each year since 2007. U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, 2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, at 12. These sentences are mild compared to the often-draconian sentences imposed on ordinary Americans, especially on poor people of color. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
298. Consider the successful prosecution of the lysine cartel that ran from 1992 to 1995. ADM,
a principal conspirator, had net sales of $12.7 billion in 1995 alone. John M. Connor, The Global
Lysine Price-Fixing Conspiracy of 1992–1995, 19 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 412, 413 (1997). ADM pled
guilty and paid a $70 million fine to DOJ for its involvement, and all the participants paid a civil
settlement of $66 million. John M. Connor, “Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel
of 1992–1995, 18 REV. INDUS. ORG. 5, 14, 20 (2001). In short, ADM paid a small fraction of one
year’s revenues for its involvement in a multi-year criminal conspiracy.
299. John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays,
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 430 (2012).
300. Id. at 430.
301. Id. at 479.
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“the ‘cluster bombs’ that constitute the current anti-cartel sanctions have been
duds.” 302
The DOJ’s cartel enforcement program has often taken a relatively lenient approach toward large corporations. Consider the DOJ’s enforcement
efforts against collusion in financial markets. In a series of cases targeting
collusion in the municipal bond market and the setting of the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”), the DOJ frequently entered into deferred or
non-prosecution agreements with the banks instead of pursuing indictments. 303 Under these agreements, corporate defendants avoid prosecution
typically on the condition that they pay a fine, improve internal compliance
processes, and agree not to repeat the illegal acts in the future.304 Highlighting the inadequate deterrence value of these agreements, the DOJ found in
2015 that two banks breached earlier deferred prosecution agreements and
engaged in collusion. 305
This leniency seems to extend to collusion by large actors in non-financial sectors. For instance, the DOJ declined to criminally prosecute several
leading Silicon Valley executives for conspiring not to recruit each other’s
employees and thereby suppressing the wages of software engineers and
other professionals in the tech sector. 306 The late Steve Jobs, the principal
instigator of the conspiracy, threatened to instigate patent litigation and other

302. Id.
303. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UBS AG Admits to Anticompetitive Conduct by Former Employees in the Municipal Bond Investments Market and Agrees to Pay $160 Million to
Federal and State Agencies (May 4, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ubs-ag-admits-anticompetitive-conduct-former-employees-municipal-bond-investments-market-and; Press Release, U.S.
Department of Justice, JPMorgan Chase Admits to Anticompetitive Conduct by Former Employees
in the Municipal Bond Investments Market and Agrees to Pay $228 Million to Federal and State
Agencies (July 7, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jpmorgan-chase-admits-anticompetitiveconduct-former-employees-municipal-bond-investments; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Deutsche Bank’s London Subsidiary Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-subsidiary-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-running-manipulation; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Rabobank Admits Wrongdoing in Libor Investigation, Agrees to Pay $3225 Criminal Penalty (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rabobank-admits-wrongdoing-libor-investigation-agrees-pay-325-million-criminal-penalty.
304. PUB. CITIZEN, JUSTICE DEFERRED: THE USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS IN THE AGE OF “TOO BIG TO JAIL” 5 (2014), https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/justice-deferred-too-big-to-jail-report.pdf.
305. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas (May
20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas. For
the history and ineffectiveness of corporate deferred and non-prosecution agreements, see
BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS (2014).
306. United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10 cv 1629, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83756 (D.D.C.
Mar. 18, 2011). In October 2016, the DOJ and FTC put out guidance stating that this type of collusion could be subject to criminal prosecution. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS (2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download.
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legal attacks on tech companies that did not abide by the “no-poaching”
agreement for skilled professionals. 307 Google fired a human resources official who breached this agreement and sought to recruit an Apple employee. 308
Although this conspiracy was a per se violation, the DOJ held off on pursuing
a criminal case and entered into a civil settlement with Apple, Google, and
Intel, among others. 309 This settlement required no admission of guilt from
the companies and only mandated that they not engage in collusive wage
suppression for a fixed period of time. 310 Neither the government complaint
nor the settlement named the individual wrongdoers, suggesting the DOJ was
not even willing to shame Jobs and his fellow conspirators. 311 It took a private class action on behalf of workers hurt by the wage suppression pact to
reveal the identities of the elite conspirators. 312 In a recent case against a nopoach agreement between two rail equipment manufacturers, the DOJ once
again accepted a civil settlement. 313 Along with this general leniency toward
large businesses and their executives, the DOJ appears to be more forgiving
toward companies that engage in comparatively sophisticated forms of collusion-like restraints. 314
307. Mark Ames, Revealed: Apple and Google’s Wage-Fixing Cartel Involved Dozens More
(Mar.
22,
2014),
Companies,
Over
One
Million
Employees,
PANDO
https://pando.com/2014/03/22/revealed-apple-and-googles-wage-fixing-cartel-involved-dozensmore-companies-over-one-million-employees/. Mark Ames, Steve Jobs Threatened Palm’s CEO,
Plainly and Directly, Court Documents Reveal, PANDO (Feb. 19, 2014),
https://pando.com/2014/02/19/court-documents-reveal-steve-jobs-blistering-threat-to-ceo-whowouldnt-join-wage-fixing-cartel/ [hereinafter Ames, Steve Jobs Threatened].
308. Robert Faturechi, Apple, Google Agree to Settle Antitrust Class Action, Lawyer’s Office
Says, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-applegoogle-agree-to-settle-antitrust-class-action-lawyers-office-says-20140424-story.html.
309. Adobe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83756, at *4; Ames, Steve Jobs Threatened, supra note 307.
310. Adobe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83756, at *1, 4–5, 12.
311. Id. at *4.
312. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111–12 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
David Streitfeld, Engineers Allege Hiring Collusion in Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/technology/engineers-allege-hiring-collusion-in-silicon-valley.html.
313. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Knorr and Wabtec to Terminate Unlawful Agreements Not to Compete for Employees (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-knorr-and-wabtec-terminate-unlawful-agreementsnot-compete.
314. Consider the KeySpan-Morgan Stanley matter. In 2011, DOJ uncovered a collusive financial swap agreement between KeySpan, a large power generator in New York City, and a rival
generator, using Morgan Stanley as an intermediary. The DOJ did not pursue a criminal prosecution
and instead settled the civil complaint by requiring KeySpan to disgorge less than twenty-five percent of its estimated profits from the illegal conspiracy. United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F.
Supp. 2d 633, 636–27, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Comment
Letter on Proposed Final Judgment in United States v. Keyspan Corp. 11 (Apr. 30, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f259700/259704-5.pdf (“KeySpan’s ill-gotten gains far exceeded
the $12 million payment DOJ is seeking. DOJ alleges the KeySpan Swap was effective from January 16, 2006 until March, 2008. Under the swap agreement, if the market price for capacity exceeded $7.57 per kW-month, the financial services company . . . would pay KeySpan the difference
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At the same time as it practices leniency with American corporate giants, the DOJ has brought a number of criminal actions against small-time
price fixers. 315 It successfully prosecuted a number of individuals for rigging
the auctions for foreclosed homes in Alabama, California, and Georgia 316 and
obtained prison sentences and fines for conspirators. 317 At these auctions,
banks and other financial institutions sell foreclosed homes and recover the
amount outstanding on the mortgage of the defaulting homeowners. 318 The
DOJ admitted the principal victims of this type of collusion are financial institutions and other investors, not distressed homeowners. 319 In its anti-cartel
activities in the financial sector, the DOJ conformed to a disappointing pattern seen in other areas: treat banks that cheat the public gently, punish those
who cheat the banks harshly. 320
The DOJ brought a number of other criminal cartel cases of dubious
public value. The DOJ targeted collusion in the obscure market for heir location services, which “identify people who may be entitled to an inheritance
from the estate of a relative who died without a will.” 321 Over the past decade, other cartel cases involved ready-mix cement makers in Northern
between the market price and $7.57, times 1800 MW.” (footnote omitted) (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 9950
(Mar. 4, 2010))
315. Prosecuting Collusion and Fraud at Real Estate Foreclosure Auctions: Division Update
Spring 2016, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-2016/real-estate-foreclosure-auctions [hereinafter Division Update].
316. E.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Georgia Real Estate Investor Convicted of Bid Rigging and Bank Fraud at Public Foreclosure Auctions (June 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/georgia-real-estate-investor-convicted-bid-rigging-and-bank-fraud-public-foreclosure-auctions; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Northern California Real Estate Investor Convicted
of Rigging Bids at Public Foreclosure Auctions (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/northern-california-real-estate-investor-convicted-rigging-bids-public-foreclosureauctions; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Alabama Real Estate Investor Sentenced for Bid Rigging
and Fraud at Public Foreclosure Auctions (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alabamareal-estate-investor-sentenced-bid-rigging-and-fraud-public-foreclosure-auctions.
317. E.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Northern California Real Estate Investor Sentenced
to Prison for Rigging Bids at Public Foreclosure Auctions (July 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/northern-california-real-estate-investor-sentenced-prison-rigging-bids-public-foreclosure.
318. Division Update, supra note 315.
319. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two Georgia Real Estate Investors Plead Guilty to
Rigging Bids at Public Home Foreclosure Auctions (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-georgia-real-estate-investors-plead-guilty-rigging-bids-public-home-foreclosure-auctions (“[T]he purpose of the conspiracies was to suppress and restrain competition and divert money to the conspirators that otherwise would have gone to pay off the mortgage and other
holders of debt secured by the properties and, in some cases, the defaulting homeowner.”).
320. DAVID DAYEN, CHAIN OF TITLE: HOW THREE ORDINARY AMERICANS UNCOVERED
WALL STREET’S GREAT FORECLOSURE FRAUD 240 (2016); David Dayen, Big Bank Punishment
Don’t Fit Their Crimes, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 22, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/big-bank-punishments-dont-fit-their-crimes.
321. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, First Charges Brought in Investigation of Collusion Among
Heir Location Services Firms (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-chargesbrought-investigation-collusion-among-heir-location-services-firms.
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Iowa, 322 gasoline stations in a town in Oklahoma, 323 online sellers of lanyards
and wristbands, 324 third-party retailers of wall posters on Amazon, 325 and
sellers of packaged ice in Cincinnati and Minneapolis. 326
While expressing the strongest condemnation of collusion, the Supreme
Court weakened private enforcement and thereby helped undermine cartel
deterrence efforts. 327 Over the past forty years, the Court raised the procedural barriers for private plaintiffs, in particular class action plaintiffs.328 The
Court reinterpreted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow defendants
to get cases dismissed more easily, whether at the pleadings 329 or summary
judgment stage. 330 Along with rewriting pleading standards in a businessfriendly manner, the Court raised the burden for certifying classes 331 and re-

322. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Iowa Company Pleads Guilty to Participating in ReadyMix Concrete Price-Fixing and Bid-Rigging Conspiracy (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iowa-company-pleads-guilty-participating-ready-mix-concrete-price-fixing-andbid-rigging.
323. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Convenience Store Company and Individual Charged with
Retail Gasoline Price Fixing in Oklahoma (Sept. 19, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/September/08-at-838.html.
324. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, E-Commerce Company and Top Executive Agree to Plead
Guilty to Price-Fixing Conspiracy for Customized Promotional Products (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/e-commerce-company-and-top-executive-agree-plead-guilty-pricefixing-conspiracy-customized.
325. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Online Retailer Pleads Guilty for Fixing Prices of Wall
Posters (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/online-retailer-pleads-guilty-fixing-priceswall-posters.
326. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Cincinnati Packaged-Ice Manufacturer Sentenced to Pay
$9 Million for Its Role in a Customer and Territory Allocation Conspiracy (Mar. 2, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cincinnati-packaged-ice-manufacturer-sentenced-pay-9-millionits-role-customer-and-territory; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Minneapolis Packaged-Ice Company Agrees to Plead Guilty to Customer Allocation Conspiracy (Oct. 13, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/minneapolis-packaged-ice-company-agrees-plead-guilty-customer-allocation-conspiracy.
327. See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment
of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1272, 1285 (2013) (finding that
private enforcement likely deters more anticompetitive behavior than the DOJ’s anti-cartel enforcement activities).
328. Jason Rathod & Sandeep Vaheesan, The Arc and Architecture of Private Enforcement Regimes in the United States and Europe: A View Across the Atlantic, 14 U. N.H. L. REV. 303, 323–
37 (2016).
329. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (ruling that a plaintiff’s pleading
must be plausible on its face and rise above a speculative level).
330. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (granting
summary judgment for defendants because there is no plausible motive for predatory price fixing);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (finding summary judgment for defendants because there is no plausible motive for price fixing); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322–23 (1986) (ruling that the non-movant must show there is a genuine dispute of material fact to
avoid summary judgment).
331. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
US. 338, 349–50 (2011).
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quired the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in nearly all instances, including those that deprive injured parties of the right to litigate on
a collective basis through class actions. 332 Class actions are often the only
means of seeking redress for illegal conduct, such as a price-fixing conspiracy, that inflicts small harm on a large number of individuals. 333 In antitrust
actions, the Court also limited consumer standing to direct purchasers, meaning consumers more than one level removed from an antitrust violator cannot
obtain damages under federal antitrust law. 334
B. Workers in the Antitrust Crosshairs
1. Enforcement Actions Against Workers’ Collective Action
Even as the courts and agencies relaxed antitrust doctrine concerning
corporate mergers and monopolies and presided over dramatic increases in
market concentration, they continue to police the collective action of workers. The agencies and courts mechanically apply the logic that horizontal
coordination among independent economic actors is the “supreme evil of antitrust” 335 and employed antitrust against the efforts of workers and other
small players to build power through joint action. 336 While the courts do
recognize the statutory exemption in the Clayton Act for organized labor, 337
this exemption protects only workers who have, or are seeking, employee
status. 338 Given employers’ increasing classification—and misclassification 339—of workers as independent contractors across the economy, 340 the
332. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559
U.S. 662, 685 (2010).
333. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY § 5.2.1, at 9–10 (Mar.
2015),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress2015.pdf (finding that consumers in financial services markets rarely file individual arbitration
claims for amounts of less than $1,000).
334. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728–29 (1977).
335. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
336. Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 196
(2001).
337. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236–37 (1996).
338. E.g., Spence v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1007, 1012–13 (D. Alaska 1990);
Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969, 1032–33 (2016).
339. See Danny Vinik, The Real Future of Work, POLITICO MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2018,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/04/future-work-independent-contractors-alternative-work-arrangements-216212 (“[S]tate-level audits indicate that about 10 percent to 30 percent
of American workers are currently misclassified. There are also some indications that misclassification is becoming more widespread.”).
340. See Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015, at 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
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Clayton Act’s exemption for labor, as currently interpreted, provides many
workers with no protection from antitrust investigations and lawsuits.
The Supreme Court and lower courts held that workers who are not employees under the National Labor Relations Act 341 can be liable for collusive
conduct under the antitrust laws. Consider the case FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass’n. 342 A group of public defenders believed the District of
Columbia underpaid them for their services and organized a boycott of the
city’s public defender service. 343 Through this boycott, the public defenders
obtained an increase in their hourly rates from the city council. 344 The FTC
brought an enforcement action against the attorneys, alleging they engaged
in a group boycott and price fixing, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 345 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the FTC, holding that the public
defenders committed a per se violation. 346 While the lawyers’ action resembled a strike, the Court did not even address whether the lawyers were protected by the Clayton Act’s labor exemption, likely because the lawyers were
independent contractors. 347
While they appear to ignore labor market practices and structures that
hurt workers, 348 the federal antitrust agencies, especially the FTC, have made
policing collusion between workers a priority. The FTC brought a number
22667, 2016) (finding “that the percentage of workers engaged in alternative work arrangements—
defined as temporary help agency workers, on-call workers, contract company workers, and independent contractors or freelancers—rose from 10.7 percent in February 2005 to 15.8 percent in late
2015”). Remarkably, Katz and Krueger find that ninety-four percent of the net employment growth
in the U.S. economy between 2005 and 2015 happened in these alternative work arrangements. Id.
at 7. For the growth of outsourcing of previously core business functions and the rise of alternative
labor arrangements, see generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME
SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014).
341. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
342. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
343. Id. at 416–18.
344. Id. at 418.
345. Id. at 418–19.
346. Id. at 436.
347. Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor
Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1563 (2018).
348. See supra Section III.A (discussing DOJ’s slap on the wrist remedy against tech giants that
colluded against workers); see also Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power,
132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 542 (2018) (“Relying, we suspect, on the traditional assumption of economists that labor markets are competitive, the agencies have never blocked a merger because of its
effect on labor markets—or, even, as far as we know, given the labor market effects of a potential
merger more than cursory attention.”); Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t Paychecks Growing? A BurgerJoint Clause Offers a Clue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/pay-growth-fast-food-hiring.html (“Some of fast-food’s biggest
names, including Burger King, Carl’s Jr., Pizza Hut and, until recently, McDonald’s, prohibited
franchisees from hiring workers away from one another, preventing, for example, one Pizza Hut
from hiring employees from another.”); José Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration 13 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24147, 2017) (“We find that higher labor market
concentration is associated with significantly lower real wages.”).
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of actions against professionals who undertook conduct that limited competition and downward pressure on incomes. The FTC has gone after practices
that resemble strike-like conduct. In two actions, the FTC alleged that physicians groups in Modesto, California and Boulder, Colorado “refuse[d], and
threaten[ed] to refuse, to deal with insurance providers, unless they raised the
fees paid to the groups’ doctors.” 349 Over the past few decades, the FTC
brought numerous cases against doctors across the country who engaged in
collective bargaining or similar activity with private and public payors.350 Of
the seven cases the FTC has litigated before the Supreme Court since 1986,
three involved dentists and another involved public defenders. 351 While this
figure does not necessarily reflect the agency’s overall enforcement activities, it calls for a critical examination of the agency’s priorities. The DOJ
brought multiple similar actions against medical professionals who acted in
concert. 352 To put this enforcement activity in perspective, the DOJ since the
year 2000 filed more cases against chiropractors for collective bargaining
than against monopolists for exclusionary conduct. 353
While doctors generally earn six-figure salaries and enjoy high status in
the United States, 354 they, like many other workers, often face powerful corporate buyers for their services—namely private insurance companies—and
typically possess little bargaining power as individual practitioners.355 Yet,
the antitrust actions against doctors ignored the power of the insurers. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in affirming an FTC
349. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settles Price-Fixing Charges Against Two Separate Doctors’ Groups (Dec. 24, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/12/ftcsettles-price-fixing-charges-against-two-separate-doctors.
350. E.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Santiago,
155 F.T.C. 874 (2013); In re Higgins, 149 F.T.C. 1114 (2010); In re Conn. Chiropractic Ass’n, 145
F.T.C. 163 (2008); In re Me. Health Alliance, 136 F.T.C. 616 (2003).
351. The three cases involving dentists are North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,
135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015), California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999), and FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). The case concerning public defenders is FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
352. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Idaho Orthopedists Charged with Engaging in Group
Boycotts and Denying Medical Care to Injured Workers (May 28, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/idaho-orthopedists-charged-engaging-group-boycotts-and-denying-medical-careinjured-workers; United States v. Chiropractic Assocs., Ltd., No. CV 13-04030-LLP, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 141345 (D.S.D. Sept. 3, 2013); United States v. Okla. State Chiropractic Indep. Physicians Ass’n, No. 13-CV-21-TCK-TLW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90485 (N.D. Okla. May 21, 2013)
353. Compare, e.g., Chiropractic Assocs., Ltd., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141345, and Okla. State
Chiropractic Indep. Physicians Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90485, with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, at 5, and .S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
2000–2009 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, at 6 (showing a total of one Sherman Act monopoly complaint filed in court from 2000 to 2017).
354. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Medicine’s Top Earners Are Not the M.D.s, N.Y. TIMES (May 17,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/sunday-review/doctors-salaries-are-not-the-bigcost.html.
355. John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, 91 WASH. L. REV. 253, 284–85
(2016).
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order against a group of physicians in the Fort Worth area, showed this disregard for buyer-side power. The court did not consider whether the insurers
had the capacity to depress payments to physicians and upheld the FTC’s
decision, in part, because the physicians’ group “us[ed] collective bargaining
power to demand higher fees for physicians who are already under contract
with a payor.” 356
These antitrust enforcement activities against workers and small proprietors have not been restricted to medical professionals or other well-heeled
professionals. These actions run the gamut of occupations. The FTC brought
enforcement actions against animal breeders,357 electricians, 358 ice skating
teachers, 359 managers of commercial and residential properties, 360 music
teachers, 361 organists, 362 and public defenders (again) 363 for adopting codes
of ethics that restrained direct competition in an effort to maintain or raise
members’ incomes and promote a shared identity among members. 364 FTC
investigations sweep even more broadly than enforcement actions would suggest. For instance, the FTC investigated truck drivers at several ports for
seeking to organize for higher wages, reduced hours, and improved working

356. N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 369 (5th Cir. 2008).
357. In re Nat’l Ass’n of Animal Breeders, Inc., No. C-4558, 2015 F.T.C. LEXIS 267 (Nov. 2,
2015).
358. In re Prof’l Lighting & Sign Mgmt. Cos., Inc., 159 F.T.C. 261 (2015).
359. In re Prof’l Skaters Ass’n, 159 F.T.C. 758 (2015).
360. In re Nat’l Ass’n of Residential Prop. Managers, Inc., No. C-4490, 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS
217 (Oct. 1, 2014).
361. In re Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, Inc., No. C-4448, 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 68 (Apr. 3, 2014);
In re Nat’l Ass’n of Teachers of Singing, Inc., No. C-4491, 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 218 (Oct. 1, 2014).
362. In re Am. Guild of Organists, No. C-4617, 2017 F.T.C. LEXIS 76 (May 26, 2017).
363. In re Lewis, 138 F.T.C. 213 (2004).
364. Some of these occupations appear to provide very modest remuneration for workers. See,
e.g., William Peek, Comment on In re Am. Guild of Organists (May 2, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2017/05/00013-140686.pdf
(“Church organists are often highly skilled, highly trained musicians. A quick perusal of the church
jobs listed on the AGO website reveals that the majority require a minimum of a Bachelor’s degree
in music, and many require a Masters and more. Yet that same perusal reveals that the salaries that
are offered are very modest; most less than $20,000 per year.”). And some of the challenged rules
have social value in promoting occupational camaraderie and collective identity among members
of the professional associations. See, e.g., Paula Neihouse Moseman, Comment on Proposed Consent Agreement In re Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, Inc. (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/public-comments/comment-00233-5 (“The provision in the MTNA Code of Ethics is simply a
statement to encourage teachers to maintain a high level of professionalism. It is common courtesy
to not actively try to steal another teacher’s students away from their studio. It has absolutely nothing to do with discouraging competition! Private music teachers are always in demand and the
consumer searching for a teacher makes their choice based on a number of factors. If they don’t
like one teacher, there are always many more available.”).
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conditions. 365 And private employers and purchasers of labor services can
also use antitrust to discipline workers. 366
A January 2015 blog post revealed the FTC’s attitude toward concerted
action by professionals. In this post, an FTC official put professionals and
other independent contractors on notice that the FTC would take action
against them in the future for collective action that did not produce offsetting
consumer benefits. 367 This post elided any differences between large businesses and workers and stated they are both “subject to the same antitrust
rules of the road,” 368 in effect adopting the position that antitrust applies
equally to “a combination of all the great industrial enterprises” and “a combination of maidservants.” 369
The antitrust threat to labor today is arguably even greater than it was
during the first Gilded Age. A century ago, workers engaging in secondary
actions to advance organizing campaigns violated federal antitrust law. In
general, however, workers could undertake primary actions to unionize a
workplace. 370 Today, however, professionals and other independent contractors cannot engage in primary action and face judicial condemnation for bargaining collectively with purchasers of their services. 371
2.

Advocacy Against State and Local Policies That Can Help
Workers

Along with their enforcement activities, the agencies advocated against
collective bargaining rights at the state and local level. They wrote amicus
briefs and comment letters urging state legislators not to grant collective bargaining rights to medical professionals. 372 In November 2017, the DOJ and
365. Paul, supra note 338, at 981.
366. See, e.g., Michael Paulson, Theater Producers Accuse Casting Directors of Forming Illegal Cartel, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/theater/producerslawsuit-casting-directors.html (“The producers and casting directors have been at odds for more
than a year, as the casting directors have sought the right to collectively bargain as part of an effort,
they say, to win health care and pension benefits. They have sought representation from Teamsters
Local 817, which already represents casting directors in film and television. . . . The producers have
argued that casting directors are independent contractors, not production employees, and therefore
do not have the right to bargain collectively as a union.”).
367. Geoffrey Green, Unflattering Resemblance, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 13, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/01/unflattering-resemblance.
368. Id.
369. Int’l Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 213 (1914).
370. United Leather Workers, 265 U.S. 457, 471 (1924).
371. Green, supra note 367.
372. E.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Opposes Alaska Proposal to Allow
Physician Collective Bargaining (Jan. 31, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/01/ftc-staff-opposes-alaska-proposal-allow-physician-collective; Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Opposes Washington State Proposal to Allow Physician Collective Bargaining (Feb. 14, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/02/ftc-staff-opposes-washington-state-proposal-allow-physician.
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FTC filed a brief that, while formally about the scope of the state action doctrine, 373 attacked the City of Seattle’s ordinance granting collective bargaining rights to Uber and other cab drivers. 374 In 2008, the FTC wrote a letter
to an Indiana legislator regarding a bill to grant collective bargaining rights
to home health workers. 375 Home care providers offer critical care to the ill
and are disproportionately women of color and notoriously underpaid and
overworked. 376 In an article on this important and exploited group of workers, Vann R. Newkirk II, a staff writer at The Atlantic, described their plight:
Home-care workers are not . . . afforded wages or protections commensurate with their importance, with over a quarter living under
the poverty line and more than half reliant on public assistance.
That economic vulnerability is especially notable because of just
who tends to work in home care: Women of color are the largest
demographic group within the home-care workforce. Their vulnerability reflects a long history of exploitation of women of color
working in-home jobs, and highlights a growing inequality in the
health-care workforce, even as health coverage expands to more
and more Americans.377
Notwithstanding these economic and social realities, the FTC expressed opposition to the Ohio bill on competition policy grounds and stated that the
proposed collective bargaining rights could violate federal antitrust law.378
373. Brief for the United States & Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant
& in Favor of Reversal, Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018) (No.
17-35640), 2017 WL 5166667.
374. Marshall Steinbaum, The Feds Side Against Alt-Labor, ROOSEVELT INST.: NEXT NEW
DEAL (Nov. 16, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/feds-side-against-alt-labor/.
375. Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen et al., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to William J. Seitz, Ohio
Senate 4–5 (Feb. 14, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-hon.william-j.seitz-concerning-ohio-executive-order-2007-23s-establishcollective-bargaining-home-health-care/v080001homecare.pdf.
376. Vann R. Newkirk II, The Forgotten Providers, ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/home-health-care-workers-wages/502016/.
377. Id.
378. Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen et al. to William J. Seitz, supra note 375, at 7. The
FTC has also repeatedly opposed antitrust exemptions that would allow independent pharmacies to
negotiate collectively with private health insurers. E.g., Hearing on H.R. 1946 Before the Subcomm.
on Intellectual Prop., Competition & the Internet of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
(2012) (statement of Richard Feinstein, Dir. of the Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federaltrade-commission-concerning-h.r.1946-preserving-our-hometown-independent-pharmacies-act2011/120329pharmacytestimony.pdf; Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. (2010) (statement of Richard Feinstein, Dir. of the Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade
Comm’n),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-antitrust-enforcement-health-care-industry/101201antitrusthealthcare.pdf; The Importance of Competition and Antitrust Enforcement to Lower-Cost, HigherQuality Health Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety & Ins. of the
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 11th Cong. (2009) (statement of Richard Feinstein, Dir. of
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The antitrust agencies, especially the FTC, also devoted considerable
advocacy resources against occupational licensing regulations at the state and
local level. According to a former FTC official, the agency submitted “hundreds of comments and amicus curiae briefs” on occupational licensing issues
to state and local governmental bodies from the 1970s to the present day. 379
In its general competition advocacy, the FTC subscribes to questionable or
false assumptions about the state, markets, and antitrust law. 380 Among these
assumptions, the FTC supposes that markets exist apart from and pre-exist
the state—rather than arise from extensive state action. 381 In its advocacy
concerning occupational licensing, the FTC has treated occupational licensing as an artificial imposition instead of as market-structuring rules akin to
property, contract, and tort rules. 382
Licensing can protect consumer health and safety383 and also yield important benefits for workers, such as higher wages. 384 The percentage of
workers subject to licensing increased at the same time as the percentage of
workers in a union declined. 385 Although it would be mistaken to infer a
causal connection between the two trends, these developments suggest that
the expansion of occupational licensing may function for workers as an imperfect substitute to unionization. 386 Licensing may also mitigate the effects
of gender and racial discrimination in the labor market. 387 In light of its implication of myriad public interests, occupational licensure is an example of
the Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-importance-competitionand-antitrust-enforcement-lower/090716healthcaretestimony.pdf.
379. Competition and the Potential Costs and Benefits of Professional Licensure: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. 9 (2014) (statement of Andrew Gavil, Dir. Of the
Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm’n), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/568171/140716professionallicensurehouse.pdf (footnote omitted).
380. Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951, 955–87
(2008).
381. Id. at 954. See generally Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism: Reappraising Occupational Licensure and Competition Policy, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
309 (2018).
382. Vaheesan & Pasquale, supra note 381, at 317.
383. WHITE HOUSE, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 11
(2016).
384. See id. at 14 (“Estimates that account for differences in education, training, and experience
find that licensing results in 10 percent to 15 percent higher wages for licensed workers relative to
unlicensed workers.”).
385. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 676, 678–79 (2010).
386. See Maury Gittleman & Morris M. Kleiner, Wage Effects of Unionization and Occupational Licensing Coverage in the United States, 69 ILR REV. 142, 169–70 (2016) (finding wage
premia in both unionized and licensed labor markets but higher wage premia for unionized segments).
387. Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, Occupational Licensing Reduces Racial and Gender
Wage Gaps: Evidence from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 36 (Univ. of Chicago,
Working Paper No. 2017-050, 2017), https://ideas.repec.org/p/hka/wpaper/2017-50.html.
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policy that requires moral and political judgments and should not be cabined
in a narrow technocratic frame. 388
Rather than acknowledging the nuances of licensing, the FTC adopts an
almost categorical position, treating licensing as a general economic menace
and calling on states to evaluate licensing rules solely through the prism of
consumer welfare and consumer protection. 389 To be sure, occupational licensing today is not perfect nor above criticism. It should be subject to careful examination and reformed as appropriate. 390 The FTC, however, defines
the legitimate purposes of occupational regulation narrowly and appears to
believe that the appropriate scope of democratic policymaking is limited. In
a letter exemplifying this economistic ideology, the FTC wrote to a Chicago
alderman concerning a taxicab regulation under consideration in the city that
“[a]ny restrictions on competition that are implemented should be no broader
than necessary to address legitimate subjects of regulation, such as safety and
consumer protection, and narrowly crafted to minimize any potential anticompetitive impact.” 391
IV. HOW REMAKING ANTITRUST LAW COULD HELP END THE NEW GILDED
AGE
Congress, the antitrust agencies, and federal courts should restore the
original anti-monopoly, pro-worker vision for the antitrust laws. For much
of their history, these laws had a pro-capital, anti-worker orientation. Notwithstanding this record, these laws can be reoriented to police capital and
accommodate labor in accord with the intent of Congress. In passing these
laws, Congress aimed to curtail the power of capital and also preserve space
for workers to organize. 392 The antitrust agencies and federal courts should
388. See RAHMAN, supra note 40, at 99 (“The analysis of complex multifaceted problems necessarily entails value judgments of some kind—particularly in the case of political problems which
are generally ill formed, with tremendous uncertainty and no single optimal solution. In these settings, technocratic judgment cannot fully determine the all-things-considered ‘best’ public policy.”).
389. See, e.g., Letter from Susan S. DeSanti et al., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Loris Jones, Tex. Bd.
of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs 4 (Aug. 20, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-comment-texas-board-veterinary-medical-examiners-concerningrule-573.17-regarding-animal-teeth-floating/100910texasteethfloating.pdf (“The proposed rule
would modify existing Texas regulations to effectively prohibit non-veterinarians from providing
specific and commonly-available forms of horse floating, absent veterinarian supervision. If enacted, the rule appears likely to significantly restrict competition without providing any countervailing benefit, thereby harming consumers.”).
390. E.g., Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, New Illinois Laws Loosen Employment Restrictions for Ex-Offenders, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-illinois-laws-criminal-records-118-biz-20170117-story.html.
391. Letter from Andrew I. Gavil et al., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Brendan Reilly, Chi. City Council 4 (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffcomment-honorable-brendan-reilly-concerning-chicago-proposed-ordinance-o20141367/140421chicagoridesharing.pdf (emphasis added).
392. See supra Part I.
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reject the ahistorical and deficient efficiency paradigm and embrace the political economy framework of the sponsors of the antitrust laws. Specifically,
they need to reinterpret antitrust to restore competitive market structures and
limit the power of large businesses over consumers, producers, rivals, and
citizens. Along with imposing checks on the power of large businesses, Congress, the agencies, and the courts must preserve freedom of action for workers acting in concert.
New statutes and executive and judicial reinterpretation of antitrust law,
in accord with congressional intent, would help remedy many economic and
political injustices in the United States today. Monopoly and oligopoly appear to contribute to a host of societal ills. These include increased inequality, 393 diminished income for workers 394 and other producers, 395 and declining business formation. 396 At the same time, protecting workers’ collective
action against antitrust challenges would create more space for workers to
organize and claim a fairer share of income and wealth. 397 Restoring antitrust
law to its original goals would likely produce a more just and equitable society. Although no means a panacea for what ails the United States, antitrust
law should be part of a broader social democratic agenda that reduces the
yawning inequalities in wealth and power today. 398
393. A large fraction of monopoly and oligopoly profits likely accrue to the most affluent segment of society. In 2012, the top 0.1% of the wealth distribution captured 33% of capital income,
defined to include “dividends, taxable interest, rents, estate and trust income, the profits of S-corporations, sole proprietorships and partnerships.” Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Data, 131 Q. J. ECON.
519, 530 (2016); see also William S. Comanor & Robert H. Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution
of Wealth, 89 Q. J. ECON. 177, 189–93 (1975) (estimating monopoly’s contribution to income inequality in the 1960s). See generally Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality:
The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2017) (discussing economic and political connections between market power and inequality).
394. Azar et al., supra note 348, at 12; Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares 26
(2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/jmp_simcha-barkai.pdf.
395. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice Stucke, The E-Scraper and E-Monopsony, AUTHORS GUILD
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-advocacy/law-profs-antitrust-enforcersrein-super-platforms-look-upstream/ (correlating the decline in average income for authors to the
growing monopsony power of Amazon over book publishers); DARCY TAJ & EMILY KERR, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF DALL., GO FIGURE: WHAT’S DRIVING WIDE GAP BETWEEN CATTLE AND BEEF
PRICES? (2017), https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/swe/2017/swe1702f.pdf
(identifying a possible connection between increased concentration in meatpacking and food retailing and growing spread between beef prices paid by consumers pay and cattle prices paid to ranchers).
396. Stacy Mitchell, The View from the Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of America’s Independent Businesses, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 498, 502 (2016) (noting growth in the political power of large
businesses and the decrease in small business formation).
397. For an examination of the relationship between labor organization and inequality, see
Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM.
SOC. REV. 513, 532 (2011) (finding that the decline of unions explains between one-fifth to onethird of the increase in wage inequality).
398. See generally ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? (2015).
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Reinterpreting and reviving antitrust law will require new legislation
from Congress, 399 a radical remaking of the federal antitrust agencies and the
courts, or some combination of both. Congress, the DOJ, the FTC, and the
courts would have to undo a thick accretion of pro-business, anti-worker case
law and guidelines. 400 The current Supreme Court and the Trump administration are, if anything, likely to entrench the consumer welfare antitrust
that failed consumers and workers, to continue to tolerate the abuses of monopolies and monopsonies, and to deploy antitrust against the powerless. 401
Yet, administrations and the composition of the Supreme Court are not destined to remain the same.
Already signs of progress are clear. Along with bills on strengthening
antitrust in Congress, a number of members of Congress and candidates for
Congress are making antitrust a centerpiece of their agenda. 402 At least on
the Democratic side, antitrust and anti-monopoly appear likely to be important themes in the contest to be the party’s presidential nominee in 2020.
And if and when an administration committed to the revival of antitrust and
control of corporate power is elected, it would have an opportunity to pursue
a different course on antitrust through both appointments to the federal antitrust agencies and to the judiciary. In relying on the executive branch and
the courts, the conservative reinterpretation—and retrenchment—of antitrust

399. See Chuck Schumer, A Better Deal for American Workers, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/chuck-schumer-employment-democrats.html (“We
are going to fight to allow regulators to break up big companies if they’re hurting consumers and to
make it harder for companies to merge if it reduces competition.”). In the fall of 2017, Senator Amy
Klobuchar and nine Democratic co-sponsors introduced a bill to strengthen the Clayton Act’s merger provisions. Press Release, Senator Amy Klobuchar, Klobuchar, Senators Introduce Legislation
to Modernize Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/9/klobuchar-senators-introduce-legislation-to-modernize-antitrust-enforcement.
400. See supra Part III.
401. Sandeep Vaheesan, Corporations Have a Friend in Judge Kavanaugh, HILL (Aug. 29,
2018),
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/404167-corporations-have-a-friend-in-judge-kavanaugh; Sandeep Vaheesan, Neil Gorsuch’s Alarming Views on Antitrust and Monopoly, WASH.
MONTHLY (Mar. 17, 2017), http://washingtonmonthly.com/2017/03/17/neil-gorsuchs-alarmingviews-on-antitrust-and-monopoly/; Cecilia Kang, How Trump’s Pick for Top Antitrust Cop May
Shape Competition, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/technology/how-trumps-pick-for-top-antitrust-cop-may-shape-competition.html/; Brian Fung, Trump
Names Maureen Ohlhausen as Acting FTC Chairwoman, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/01/25/trump-names-maureen-ohlhausen-as-acting-ftc-chairwoman/?utm_term=.46441ca17764.
402. E.g., Senator Elizabeth Warren, Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open Markets Program Event: Reigniting Competition in the American Economy (June 29, 2016), http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-6-29_Warren_Antitrust_Speech.pdf; Matthew Yglesias,
Booker Calls on Antitrust Regulators to Start Paying Attention to Workers, VOX (Nov. 1, 2017),
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/11/1/16571992/booker-antitrust-letter;
David
Dayen, Anti-Monopoly Candidates Are Testing a New Politics in the Midterms, INTERCEPT (Oct. 1,
2017), http://theintercept.com/2017/10/01/anti-monopoly-candidates-are-testing-a-new-politics-inthe-midterms/.
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offers one model for reviving the field. 403 And even in the near term, litigation can yield important advances. Some lower courts appear receptive to
reinvigorating or at least honoring mid-century precedents the Supreme
Court has not overruled. 404
A. Confronting the Power of Capital
A reinterpretation of the antitrust laws needs to be founded on the political economy embodied in the legislative histories of the principal antitrust
laws. The Congresses that enacted these statutes were not concerned with
narrow economics or some abstract notion of competition. Instead, they
sought to control the power of the new monopolies and trusts that dominated
the American political economy. They had a broad conception of the power
of large-scale enterprise and considered—and condemned—the trusts’ power
over consumers, producers, competitors, and citizens. 405 A review of the legislative histories reveals economic and political ideas that are consonant with
popular concerns about corporate power today. 406
Permissive merger and monopoly policy resulted in a highly concentrated industrial structure.407 Numerous sectors across the economy became

403. Consider the conservative Supreme Court’s weakening of antitrust precedent on vertical
restraints over four decades. The Court overturned the per se rule for territorial and other non-price
restraints in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In the 1980s, it undermined the effectiveness of the long-standing per se rule against resale price maintenance in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). In 2007, thirty years after Sylvania, the Court overruled
the nearly-century old per se ban on resale price maintenance. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
404. See, e.g., FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, and FTC v.
Procter & Gamble for the proposition that the Supreme Court has not adopted an efficiencies defense for otherwise illegal mergers and that Congress supported decentralized market structure even
at the cost of some merger-related efficiencies). Nonetheless, the antitrust agencies in their guidelines have recognized an efficiencies defense. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
supra note 20, § 10 (“[A] primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate
significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which
may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products. For example,
merger-generated efficiencies may enhance competition by permitting two ineffective competitors
to form a more effective competitor, e.g., by combining complementary assets.”).
405. See supra Section I.A.
406. See, e.g., Ryan Cooper, Google Is a Monopoly—and It’s Crushing the Internet, WEEK
(Apr. 21, 2017), http://theweek.com/articles/693488/google-monopoly—crushing-internet; Lina M.
Khan, Amazon Bites Off Even More Monopoly Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/opinion/amazon-whole-foods-jeff-bezos.html.
407. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET
POWER 7 (2016); Riding the Wave, ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21587207-corporate-dealmakers-should-heed-lessons-past-mergerwaves-riding-wave.
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more concentrated over the past two decades. 408 A few examples are illustrative. In the airline industry, the number of major carriers declined from
nine to four since 2005. 409 Two duopolies dominate railroads—one east of
the Mississippi and one west of it. 410 The wireless industry has four major
players, 411 with AT&T and Verizon accounting for approximately seventy
percent of market share by revenue. 412 In agriculture, concentration increased dramatically in markets throughout the supply chain, starting with
inputs such as fertilizer and seeds through processing of farmers’ crops, livestock, and poultry and food retailing. 413 Most local labor markets in the
United States, and in rural areas in particular, are highly concentrated (as defined by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines) 414 and have become more concentrated since the 1970s. 415
Consumer welfare antitrust failed even on consumer welfare grounds.
In metropolitan areas across the country, hospital mergers created highly concentrated markets for hospital services and contributed to higher costs in
health care. 416 John Kwoka has shown that the antitrust agencies often failed
to challenge mergers that had subsequent anticompetitive effects (higher
short-term consumer prices). 417 Furthermore, Kwoka found that merger remedies, especially behavioral remedies, often failed to preserve competition. 418

408. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 407, at 4.
409. A Lack of Competition Explains the Flaws in American Aviation, ECONOMIST (Apr. 22,
2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/04/22/a-lack-of-competition-explains-the-flawsin-american-aviation; Dominic Rushe, American and US Airways Officially Merge to Create
World’s Biggest Airline, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/dec/09/american-us-airways-merge-worlds-biggest-airlines.
410. Doing the Locomotion, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.economist.com/business/2016/02/11/doing-the-locomotion.
411. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, DA 16-1061, ANNUAL REPORT & ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE
MARKET CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO MOBILE WIRELESS, INCLUDING COMMERCIAL MOBILE
SERVICES 5 (2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-16-1061A1.pdf.
412. Id. at 14.
413. Diana L. Moss & C. Robert Taylor, Short Ends of the Stick: The Plight of Growers and
Consumers in Concentrated Agricultural Supply Chains, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 337, 341–44 (2014).
414. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, § 5.3.
415. Azar et al., supra note 348, at 9–10, http://www.marinescu.eu/AzarMarinescuSteinbaum.pdf; Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer
Concentration Affect Wages? 3 (2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/benmelech/html/BenmelechPapers/BBK_2018_January_31.pdf.
416. Martin Gaynor et al., The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets, 53 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 235, 238–39, 259–61 (2015); see Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid:
Why the United States Is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 103 (2003) (finding that higher health care spending in the United States is due to higher unit prices for services
rather than higher utilization of services).
417. See JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 110–11 (2015).
418. Id. at 120.
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Other research has also shown that increased market concentration contributes to higher consumer prices. 419
The failures of consumer welfare antitrust become even clearer when a
broader set of economic and political interests are examined. Higher consumer prices are one manifestation of business power but only one and arguably not the most important one. Concentration in labor and product markets
contributes to lower wages. 420 Just from a consumer angle, dominant online
platforms, with their huge troves of user data and lack of effective competition, pose serious threats to personal privacy. 421 Companies that control infrastructure that support a range of activity, whether they are the electric grid
or a search engine monopoly, have the power to shape large swaths of the
economy over time. 422
The economic power of large business can also translate into great political power. 423 Empirical research found that big business exercises disproportionate influence over the political system. 424 John Browne, the former
CEO of oil and gas giant BP, explained the nexus between economic power
and political power. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal in 2003,
he described how BP’s size gives it political power:
We do get the seat at the table because of our scope and scale.
Whether we are the second or the third largest (oil) company is of
very little import, but we’re certainly up there and we operate in
places which are important to the United States government, and
the United States government is important to us. . . . We have large
numbers of employees in the United States. That’s very important
in a political system. And they are highly concentrated. So we

419. Blonigen & Pierce, supra note 229, at 24; Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of
Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications 14, 16, 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 23687, 2017); Gustavo Grullon et al., Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated? 41 (Oct. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://finance.eller.arizona.edu/sites/finance/files/grullon_11.4.16.pdf.
420. Azar et al., supra note 348, at 2; Barkai, supra note 394, at 38–39.
421. Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009, 1022–24
(2013).
422. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (“The record
makes abundantly clear that Otter Tail used its monopoly power in the towns in its service area to
foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation
of the antitrust laws. The District Court determined that Otter Tail has ‘a strategic dominance in
the transmission of power in most of its service area’ and that it used this dominance to foreclose
potential entrants into the retail area from obtaining electric power from outside sources of supply.”
(citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948))). See generally K. Sabeel Rahman, The
New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept,
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1647, 1656, 1666–69 (2018).
423. Luigi Zingales, Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 122–25
(2017).
424. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 565 (2014).
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have a very significant presence in Texas, Illinois, Alaska, California. These are important because our employees are voters. 425
Economic power extends beyond influence over politicians, regulators,
and other public officials. Comcast and Google illustrate this hegemonic
power. These giants use their power and wealth to shape the terms of debate
through financial support for academics and non-profit organizations, including organizations with otherwise progressive reputations. 426 In their funding
of academics and think tanks, these companies are representative of largescale capital, rather than outliers. Large businesses outside telecommunications and technology also use their wealth and power to manipulate the parameters of public discussion, 427 including by attempting to discipline critical
voices. 428
Current legal standards fail to provide a check on the prerogatives of
large businesses and do not even protect consumers from the burden of monopoly and oligopoly. Antitrust legal standards, such as the rule of reason
and the analytically comparable Horizontal Merger Guidelines, impose onerous burdens on plaintiffs challenging anticompetitive conduct and call for
complicated, speculative inquiries into whether a business practice or merger

425. BP Won’t Abandon Driving Force, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB106970996323058900 (interviewing John Browne, CEO, BP).
426. E.g., Brody Mullins & Jack Nicas, Paying Professors: Inside Google’s Academic Influence
Campaign, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/paying-professors-insidegoogles-academic-influence-campaign-1499785286; David Dayen, Google’s Insidious Shadow
Lobbying: How the Internet Giant Is Bankrolling Friendly Academics—and Skirting Federal Investigations, SALON (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/11/24/googles_insidious_shadow_lobbying_how_the_internet_giant_is_bankrolling_friendly_academics_and_skirting_federal_investigations/; Lee Fang, Civil Rights Groups, Funded by Telecoms, Back Donald
Trump’s Plan to Kill Net Neutrality, INTERCEPT (Feb. 13, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/02/13/naacp-trump-netneutrality/; Tom Hamburger & Matea Gold, Google, Once
Disdainful of Lobbying, Now a Master of Washington Influence, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-google-is-transforming-power-and-politicsgoogleonce-disdainful-of-lobbying-now-a-master-of-washington-influence/2014/04/12/51648b92-b4d311e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html?utm_term=.581d579f17af.
427. Eric Lipton & Brooke Williams, How Think Tanks Amplify Corporate America’s Influence,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/us/politics/think-tanks-researchand-corporate-lobbying.html. The fossil fuel and tobacco industries, in particular, have a notorious
history of funding research to discredit evidence that the burning of fossil fuels contributes to climate change and that cigarette smoking contributes to a host of serious illnesses, respectively. Coral
Davenport & Eric Lipton, How G.O.P. Leaders Came to View Climate Change as Fake Science,
N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/us/politics/republican-leadersclimate-change.html; David Heath, Contesting the Science of Smoking, ATLANTIC (May 4, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/low-tar-cigarettes/481116/.
428. E.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Google Critic Ousted from Think Tank Funded by the Tech Giant,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/eric-schmidtgoogle-new-america.html?mcubz=1.
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led to or will likely lead to consumer harm in the near term. 429 These standards ensure plaintiffs rarely win and help protect monopolistic and oligopolistic domination of markets. 430 Largely quantitative analysis, likely defective even for the consumer welfare standard, 431 cannot do justice to the
qualitative manifestations of business power identified in the legislative histories of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. 432 These standards cannot
protect the open markets or the American political system from private business power. And these standards, by elevating complexity over simplicity,
favor well-heeled interests who can afford to retain the most expensive lawyers and consultants—the monopolies and oligopolies themselves. 433
To limit the power of large corporations, Congress, the antitrust agencies, and the courts must embrace clear rules and presumptions and reject the
prevailing rule of reason approach. The Supreme Court once recognized the
importance of rules in antitrust law and the unworkability of complicated
standards. 434 For antitrust enforcement to be effective and efficient, per se
rules and presumptions of illegality must become the default in antitrust
law. 435 At present, rules are the norm only for price fixing and similar forms
of horizontal collusion. 436 Per se rules or presumptions of illegality should
govern a range of conduct that threatens structurally competitive markets.
Conduct that carries this competitive threat includes horizontal and vertical
mergers in concentrated markets and predatory pricing, exclusive dealing,
and tying by monopolists and near-monopolists. Under these presumptions,
certain firm conduct would be illegal unless the business could present credible business justifications.

429. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1375, 1385–86, 1466 (2009).
430. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 837 (2009).
431. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1,
17–22 (2016).
432. See supra Section I.A.
433. See Stucke, supra note 429, at 1461.
434. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611–12 (1972).
435. See Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per se Rules vs Rule of Reason”, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215, 220
(2006); see also Stucke, supra note 429, at 1460–65. Maurice Stucke writes:
Rule-of-reason litigation . . . is a crusade, enlisting legions of economists, lawyers, and
paralegals. It is unclear how many private litigants (even with the prospect of trebled
damages) will incur the “litany of costs” and risks associated with suing companies with
market power by embarking on such a crusade—especially if their chance of prevailing
is less than one in three.
Id. at 1461.
436. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).
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B. Recognizing Labor Is Not Just Another Commodity
The antitrust laws also need to be reinterpreted to preserve the rights of
workers to engage in collective action. The present interpretation of the statutory exemption is far too narrow and only protects workers with employee
status under federal law. 437 Workers of all types face serious obstacles when
they seek to establish a collective voice by forming a union. For workers
without employee status under federal law, they face the additional threat of
antitrust liability. Even as antitrust law permits monopolies and oligopolies
to dominate the economy, it is used to thwart the efforts of many American
workers to build countervailing power. In contrast to present administration
and interpretation of the antitrust laws, the Congresses that passed both the
Sherman and Clayton Acts sought to protect workers from antitrust attacks.
The sponsors of these statutes viewed the new laws and labor organizing as
complements in challenging and controlling the power of large-scale businesses. They made clear distinctions between capital and labor and did not
conceive of the antitrust laws as prescriptions for maximizing competition
categorically across American society. In their approach toward labor, the
framers of the antitrust statutes wanted workers to have the freedom to act in
a collective capacity. 438
The present, restrictive interpretation of the statutory antitrust exemption creates a significant legal threat to the organizing efforts of a large fraction of workers. While the exemption protects workers who are employees
under federal labor law, it does not protect workers without employee status
under federal labor law—workers classified as independent contractors may
face antitrust liability for engaging in collective action. 439 Given that nearly
nine percent of workers are now classified or misclassified as independent
contractors, 440 this threat is not merely an academic one. Antitrust law may
help deter millions of workers from organizing for higher wages and better
working conditions. The rise of precarious employment arrangements could
arguably make these “alt-labor” organizing activities as important as traditional labor organizing in the coming years. 441 A critical segment of labor
organizing is now focused on workers outside of conventional employee-employer relationships. 442

437. L.A. Meat & Provisions Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 104 (1962).
438. See supra Section I.B.
439. Paul, supra note 338, at 981. E.g., Spence v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1007,
1013 (D. Alaska 1990) (holding that marine pilots are not “employees” and, therefore, not entitled
to antitrust exemption).
440. Katz & Krueger, supra note 340, at 8.
441. Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/altlabor.
442. See Michael M. Oswalt, The Right to Improvise in Low-Wage Work, 38 CARDOZO L. REV.
959, 983–86 (2017).
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Congress or the Supreme Court should revisit the statutory exemption
and extend it to cover not just workers in traditional employee-employer arrangements but workers of all types. 443 Workers, regardless of formal legal
label and unlike capitalists, face “[p]ressures of economic necessity to work
in order to provide for one’s family and to accommodate the needs of the
person who is paying for the services are applicable to every person engaged
in a trade, calling or profession.” 444 They “must work to support themselves
and their families and must make themselves available to render services at
such times as they are needed.” 445 It is long past due for the federal antitrust
agencies and the courts to recognize the qualitative difference between home
health care workers banding together to demand a living wage and corporate
mergers that seek to enhance market control and bolster profits. All those
who labor for a living should be entitled to the antitrust exemption, not only
those workers who are “employees” under federal law.446
While congressional or judicial expansion of the labor exemption may
not happen in the near term, the federal antitrust agencies, in the meantime,
should reconsider their current enforcement priorities. They should stop investigating the concerted activity of workers, professionals, and other small
players and bringing enforcement actions against them. This proposition
should not be controversial. At a time of agency budget cuts 447 and monopolies and oligopolies in a number of sectors, 448 the antitrust agencies cannot
justify using public money to bring enforcement actions against music teachers and organists. Even under the existing antitrust paradigm centered on
consumer welfare, the music teachers’ restrictive code of ethics does not
seem like a major threat to consumer interests.449 Assuming that preserving
low consumer prices in the short run is the exclusive or primary goal of antitrust law, limits on price competition between music teachers appears inconsequential in the larger universe of anticompetitive conduct.

443. Catherine L. Fisk, Hollywood Writers and the Gig Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177,
177–79 (2017).
444. Taylor v. Local No.7, Int’l Union of Journeymen Horseshoers, 353 F.2d 593, 597 (4th Cir.
1965).
445. Id.
446. Justice William O. Douglas explained how nominal independent contractors are often economically more similar to workers than they are to entrepreneurs and contended that economic realities should trump formal labels in determining whether these contractors were entitled to antitrust
immunity. L.A. Meat & Provisions Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 108–09 (1962)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
447. E.g., Alexei Alexis, FTC Budget Would Shrink Under Trump Plan, BLOOMBERG BNA
(May 24, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ftc-budget-shrink-n73014451436/.
448. Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-giant-dose-competitiontoo-much-good-thing.
449. In re Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, Inc., No. C-4448, 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 68 (Apr. 3, 2014);
In re Nat’l Ass’n of Teachers of Singing, Inc., No. C-4491, 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 218 (Oct. 1, 2014).
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The agencies should also reevaluate their competition advocacy priorities and terminate their advocacy against occupational licensing. The present
focus on occupational licensing is misguided. While hardly perfect or immune from criticism, occupational licensing can have myriad benefits. Occupational licensing rules can protect consumer health and safety and also
raise the wages of workers. 450 In insisting on analyzing occupational licensing through the lens of consumer welfare, the FTC acknowledged only the
protection of consumers. It ignored the other policy goals frequently animating licensing statutes and regulations. Incredibly, the FTC has not merely
offered a consumer welfare angle on these regulations; it has deemed considerations besides the protection of consumer interests to be illegitimate.451
Given the forty-year stagnation in wages for ordinary Americans, 452 the
FTC’s monomaniacal fixation on (short-term) consumer interests and dismissiveness toward the welfare of workers is untenable. In attacking occupational licensing, the FTC strayed far outside its purview and demanded that
states and municipalities conform to its narrow ideology. While the FTC is
chasing the phantom menace of a “guilded” age, it may actually be promoting
a new Gilded Age. 453
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting the principal antitrust laws, Congress aimed to curtail the
power of large-scale capital and also protect labor unions from federal interference. The framers of the antitrust laws understood corporate power
broadly. These representatives and senators were not concerned with just
one manifestation of this power, such as higher prices for consumers; they
sought to protect Americans in their capacity as consumers, producers, businesses, and citizens from the power of the monopolies and trusts. Notwithstanding their great promise, the antitrust laws have a mixed record. At times,
the antitrust laws have been applied to control corporate consolidation and

450. See generally Vaheesan & Pasquale, supra note 381, at 314, 317–18.
451. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew I. Gavil et al. to Brendan Reilly, supra note 391, at 4 (“Any
restrictions on competition that are implemented should be no broader than necessary to address
legitimate subjects of regulation, such as safety and consumer protection, and narrowly crafted to
minimize any potential anticompetitive impact.”); Letter from Tara Isa Koslov et al., Fed. Trade
Comm’n, to Suzanne Geist, Neb. Senate 7 (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comments-nebraska-state-senate-regarding-number-proposed-senate-bills-would-loosen-or/neb_ol_letter_to_senator_geist.pdf (“[T]he purported consumer protection benefits of licensing may not justify the costs. Reductions in competition caused
by licensing can also cause quality, choice, and access to decline.”).
452. Scott Horsley, Despite an Economy on the Rise, American Paychecks Remain Stuck, NPR
(May 26, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/05/26/408555544/despite-economic-climb-american-paychecks-remain-stuck.
453. The author credits Frank Pasquale for this line. Instead of using their statutory powers
against big corporations, the antitrust agencies, especially the FTC, target state and local occupational licensing rules, or so-called modern guilds.
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even break up durable monopolies. For much of the mid-twentieth century,
the antitrust laws served as a powerful check on mergers and monopolies. At
other periods in their history though, the antitrust laws failed to check the
growth of corporate power and instead were used to thwart collective action
by workers. In the first Gilded Age and the new Gilded Age in which we
live, the antitrust laws have generally respected the prerogatives of monopolistic and oligopolistic businesses and often curtailed the liberty of workers.
Despite their recent history, the antitrust laws can play an important role
in addressing the staggering inequality in American society today. These
laws can and should be reinterpreted to curtail the power of capital and preserve the freedom of workers to act collectively. Strong federal checks are
necessary to maintain and restore competitive market structures and protect
Americans from corporate domination of markets, politics, and society. So
long as Congress, the federal antitrust agencies, and the courts acquiesce to
or follow the antitrust status quo, they will accept and enable the supremacy
of concentrated capital and also subvert the efforts of workers to build countervailing economic and political power. The history of antitrust law, however, shows that an animating vision and determined political action can restore “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” 454 and redistribute power and
wealth from the “economic royalists” 455 to ordinary Americans.

454. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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